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Time, Equity, and Sexual Harassment
Joseph A. Seiner*
Sexual harassment remains a pervasive problem in the workplace. Recent studies and
empirical research reveal that this unlawful conduct continues to pervade all industries and
sectors of the economy. The #MeToo movement has made great progress in raising awareness
of this problem and in demonstrating the lengths that some employers will go to conceal a
hostile work environment. The movement has further identified the lasting emotional toll
workplace harassment can have on its victims.
The research in this area demonstrates that the short timeframe harassment victims have
to bring a federal discrimination charge—180 or 300 days depending on the state—is wholly
inadequate. The deception, misrepresentation, and sexual abuse encountered by many
workplace harassment victims can make it impossible to file a timely charge. The pandemic
has further highlighted the difficulties harassment victims can face in meeting this deadline
through no fault of their own. This Article argues that the only practicable solution to this
problem is a more robust application of the centuries-old doctrine of equitable tolling to pause
the harassment time filing deadline where appropriate.
This Article identifies five equitable tolling guideposts that the courts should consider
before dismissing a sexual harassment claim on the basis of an untimely charge—psychological
harm, employer threats, fear, workplace deception, and public health. This Article discusses
how each of these markers may impact the timeliness of a harassment claim and explains
when the use of equitable tolling may be appropriate. Given the extensive research in this
area, as well as our expanded understanding of the pervasiveness of sexual harassment in the
workplace, employers should no longer be permitted to run out the clock on these claims through
their own improper conduct.

* Professor of Law and Oliver Ellsworth Professor of Federal Practice, University of South Carolina
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last several years, our society has finally begun to truly grapple with
the problem of sexual harassment and abuse—both in the workplace as well as in
other settings. While our current knowledge of the extent of the problem still only
scratches the surface, the recent research on sexual harassment has brought to light
the pervasive and widespread nature of the issue.1 This unlawful activity pervades
all industries and workplaces, affecting all income levels and job categories,
impacting both men and women alike.2
The #MeToo movement has made great strides in exposing the abuse and
harassment that is taking place, and it has substantially raised awareness of this
ongoing problem. This movement has helped clarify the extent to which employers
and their agents will go to conceal, threaten, and misrepresent their unlawful
activities.3 It has further provided us with a much better understanding of the
extreme psychological and emotional toll that this type of workplace abuse can have
on the victims of harassment.4
When facing sexual harassment, victims of this unlawful activity have an
extraordinarily short period of time to file a federal employment discrimination
1. See infra Section III.A (addressing current social science research on workplace
sexual harassment).
2. See generally infra Section III.A.
3. See infra Part III (discussing the history of the #MeToo movement and its role in identifying
and preventing workplace harassment).
4. See generally infra Part III.
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claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).5 Depending on the
state, a timely charge of sexual harassment must be filed with the U.S. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within 180 or 300 days of the
unlawful activity.6 By comparison, this time period is substantially shorter than the
two-to-four year filing period for most state law personal injury claims.7 Failure to
comply with this administrative filing requirement has dire consequences for the
claimant, as untimely discrimination charges must be dismissed, depriving
harassment victims of the opportunity to ever be heard in court.8
As the extensive research in this area now makes clear, the 180/300-day time
filing requirement for sexual harassment claims is highly problematic. The
deception, misrepresentation, and outright abuse encountered by many workplace
harassment victims make it difficult, if not impossible, to file a hostile work
environment charge in a timely manner.9 During this short time filing period,
employees experiencing workplace abuse may be unaware of the full extent of the
hostile work environment. Many workers subjected to this unlawful conduct also
encounter lasting psychological scars, and filing a charge in this short period of time
can unnecessarily force them to relive this emotional trauma without a sufficient
opportunity to recover from the abuse.10
And the events of the COVID-19 pandemic have only amplified these
difficulties; the resulting economic concerns and complexities have given employers
an additional purported legitimate rationale to use when disciplining workers, when
their true motivation is to discriminate or retaliate against an employee.11 As many
jobs move online and become more virtual in nature as a result of this public health
crisis, workers also find themselves more isolated and less able to uncover systemic
harassment perpetrated by an employer.12
This Article does not argue for congressional intervention to extend the time
filing period for Title VII hostile work environment claims, though such a change
would be both warranted and welcome. Given the current political divisiveness of
these issues, as well as the fact that the Title VII time filing deadlines have remained
unchanged for over half a century, there is little hope of legislative change in the

5. See Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
6. Id. See generally Joseph A. Seiner, The Discrimination Presumption, 94 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1115 (2019) (describing the litigation process for employment discrimination claims).
7. See infra Section II.A (comparing statute of limitations periods in personal injury cases to Title
VII claims).
8. See Title VII, 42 U.S.C § 2000e (setting forth time filing deadlines in employment
discrimination cases).
9. See infra Part III (discussing recent research on sexual harassment and shortcomings of Title
VII time filing deadlines).
10. See infra Section III.B (addressing emotional harm caused by workplace sexual harassment).
11. See infra Section III.B.5 (examining the role of the pandemic in plaintiff efforts to file timely
employment discrimination charge).
12. See generally infra Section III.B.5.
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near future.13 Instead, this Article argues for immediate judicial intervention to
better enhance access to justice for victims of workplace harassment.
The short-term answer to the existing problem of the overly rigid charge filing
period for harassment claims can be found in a legal doctrine that predates the
inception of this country and was first introduced by the courts of
chancery—equitable tolling.14 The doctrine of equitable tolling has a lengthy and
rich history, and it stands for the basic proposition that a defendant should not be
able to benefit from his own wrongdoing.15 The Supreme Court has long
recognized that the tolling of a particular statute of limitations may be necessary to
avoid the “evils of archaic rigidity.”16 In the employment discrimination context,
this means that employers should not be able to run out the clock on the charge
filing deadlines for sexual harassment claims through deception, threats, or
emotional abuse—equity can and must intervene in these situations. The courts
have a duty to step in to enforce the “humane and remedial” purposes of the
legislation in those cases.17
This Article identifies five primary guideposts for the courts to consider in
advance of dismissing a federal hostile work environment claim based on an
untimely filed charge. While all sexual harassment claims deserve close
consideration, these markers help identify the specific factual scenarios where
equitable tolling of Title VII would be particularly appropriate. These guideposts
are not exhaustive but capture the majority of instances where tolling of the statute
would be appropriate in the hostile work environment context.
Initially, the courts must closely consider those situations where a sexual
harassment plaintiff who filed an untimely charge suffered psychological or emotional
trauma because of an employer’s hostile conduct. If a worker is psychologically
unable to file a timely claim because of the abuse, the employer should not benefit
from its wrongdoing. The courts should also examine those cases where a threat of
physical harm has been made to the victim directly or indirectly or whether threats
were made to a loved one or family member of the plaintiff. Understandably, these
types of threats can dissuade a timely charge filing.
Additionally, the courts should consider the closely related issue of fear of
reprisal. Many workers reasonably, and perhaps correctly, fear that their employer
will retaliate against them with respect to their terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment if they complain in a timely manner. Also, the courts should look to
an employer’s misrepresentations or concealment of facts as an additional scenario where
tolling may be appropriate. Through this common tactic, employers often deceive

13. See infra Parts III–IV (addressing proposed equitable tolling guidelines and difficulties of
Congressional intervention).
14. See infra Part II (tracing deep historical roots of equitable tolling).
15. See generally infra Part II.
16. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 650 (2010) (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass
Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 248 (1944)).
17. Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 427–28 (1965) (internal quotation omitted).
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workers about the validity of their claim or about the extent of the harassment that
is occurring in the workplace.
Finally, it is impossible to ignore the pandemic and its potential impact on the
ability of a plaintiff to file a timely sexual harassment claim.18 On the most practical
level, the pandemic may delay a worker’s access to information necessary to
substantiate a hostile work environment charge. The health crisis may also allow
employers to conceal the true extent of their unlawful conduct, as workers now
have fewer overall interactions with one another. And the pandemic will make it
easier for employers to attempt to justify retaliatory actions taken against workers
who complain of harassment.
These five guideposts thus flag for the courts those common situations where
the judiciary should tread lightly before dismissing a sexual harassment claim as
untimely. In light of what we now know about the widespread nature of sexual
harassment in our society, as well as the extent to which employers have gone to
conceal this unlawful conduct, a more robust application of the equitable tolling
doctrine is necessary to truly effectuate the well-established goals and deterrent
effect of Title VII.19 While all hostile work environment claims must be closely
considered, this Article identifies clearly defined markers for the courts to use when
analyzing these claims.
This Article proceeds in six parts. In Part I, this Article examines the extensive
and intricate history of equitable tolling, which this country adopted from the
English common law. Part II of this Article addresses the time filing requirements
for Title VII claims, as applied by the U.S. Supreme Court, and summarizes the
federal court case law on equitable tolling for sexual harassment claims. In Part III,
this Article examines the recent research on sexual harassment, as well as the role
of the #MeToo movement in our society. This Part then identifies the five
guideposts that the federal courts should look to prior to dismissing a federal hostile
work environment claim based on timeliness—psychological harm, employer
threats, fear, deception, and public health. In Part IV, this Article helps situate the
proposed guidelines in the context of federal case law by demonstrating how several
claims would have resulted in different outcomes had these markers been properly
considered. Part V addresses the implications of the proposed guidelines, exploring
some of the costs and benefits of courts using the markers identified in sexual
harassment cases. This Article then briefly discusses the conclusions to be drawn.
I. HISTORY OF EQUITABLE TOLLING
The doctrine of equitable tolling is relatively straightforward. As Justice Story
eloquently stated almost two hundred years ago, a statutory limitations period is
“mainly intended to suppress fraud [and] ought not, then, to be so construed, as to
18. See infra Section III.B.5 (examining the role of the pandemic in preventing timely sexual
harassment claims).
19. Cf. Burnett, 380 U.S. at 427–28 (discussing tolling in workplace case).
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become an instrument to encourage fraud.”20 Simply put, tolling provides the
equitable tool to guard against the type of fraud Justice Story warned against.21
Under this legal theory, there are times when certain factual circumstances exist that
make it unfair to strictly adhere to a rigid statute of limitations in a civil matter. As
an early and well-known English case, Booth v. Earl of Warrington,22 made clear,
“[w]here there is fraud, and such fraud is concealed, no length of time can bar.”23
Where this particular set of facts exist, it may be appropriate for a court to toll, or
pause, the statute of limitations, thus permitting a claimant more flexibility in the
time allowed to bring their case.
The doctrine thus “suspends the running of the limitations period against the
party who filed late through no fault of her own”24 and “allows a court to resuscitate
untimely claims and proceed on the merits against a defendant despite a
countervailing statute of limitations.”25 In more basic terms, a court may give a party
additional time to file a claim where fairness dictates that result. While the tolling
doctrine itself is straightforward, the application of this legal theory is not as clear.
Indeed, the use of equitable tolling is highly fact-driven, and it is difficult to develop
clear rules for defining when it is appropriate to pause a time filing period. At best,
we can articulate general parameters for when equitable tolling should be considered
in a particular case.
Though the doctrine of equitable tolling may seem dry at first blush, the theory
has a long and rich history that dates back to English times and the courts of
chancery.26 A historical review of this doctrine demonstrates that the theory of
tolling was used under English law at least as far back as the 1700s.27 Under the “old

20. Sherwood v. Sutton, 21 F. Cas. 1303, 1307 (Story, Circuit Justice, C.C.D.N.H. 1828)
(No. 12,782); see Expl. Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 435, 448 (1918) (quoting id.).
21. See generally Sherwood, 21 F. Cas. at 1307; Expl. Co., 247 U.S. at 448; Malcolm L. Morris,
Troubled Taxpayers’ Tolling Troubles, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 121, 123 (“In its simplest form, equitable
tolling is a judicial constraint that allows a party to assert a claim after the statute of limitations has run
with respect to it.”).
22. Booth v. Earl of Warrington (1714) 2 Eng. Rep. 111, 111. See generally David D. Doran,
Comment, Equitable Tolling of Statutory Benefit Time Limitations: A Congressional Intent Analysis, 64
WASH. L. REV. 681, 682 n.10 (1989); Morris, supra note 21, at 124 n.14.
23. Booth, 2 Eng. Rep. at 111 (citations omitted).
24. Duane Rudolph, Workers, Dignity, and Equitable Tolling, 15 NW. J. HUM. RTS. 126,
131 (2017).
25. Id. at 127.
26. Cf. John R. Pagan, Civil Rights and “Personal Injuries”: Virginia’s Statute of Limitations for
Section 1983 Suits, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 199, 210 (1985) (“At [English] common law, the passage
of time did not affect a litigant’s right to sue. The victim of an actionable tort or breach of contract
could invoke the jurisdiction of the king’s courts at any time, no matter how stale his claim.”). See
generally Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 398 (3d Cir. 2005); Richard L. Marcus, Fraudulent Concealment
in Federal Court: Toward a More Disparate Standard?, 71 GEO. L.J. 829, 856 (1983); Morris, supra note
21 (“The concept, which took hold in early English jurisprudence, gained acceptance in the American
courts principally as an anti-fraud device.”).
27. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383, 409 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing John
F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 52 (2001)); See also
Rudolph, supra note 24, at 130 (“[T]he equitable canon [has applied] since at least colonial times, [and]
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chancery rule,” the view was adopted that “where a plaintiff has been injured by
fraud and remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care
on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is
discovered[.]”28 The early courts looked to equitable tolling where the application
of laches, or the statute of limitations, resulted in a dismissal that was
“inequitable.”29 While this determination was inherently subjective, the courts of
equity developed more defined areas where tolling was permitted.30 For example,
even where claims were brought outside of the statutory period, they would still be
allowed if the result avoided permitting one of the litigants to “profit from their
own bad conduct.”31 Indeed, in one early case, “the House of Lords held that when
a defendant concealed a fraudulent bond transaction from the plaintiff for nine
years, the defendant could not equitably assert the statute of limitation as
a defense.”32
Early application of equitable tolling in the U.S. courts often involved an effort
to avoid fraud perpetrated on one of the parties.33 Thus, in early American court
decisions, if “affirmative acts by one party prevented the injured party from learning
of the fraud, the statute of limitations would be tolled until the fraud was
discovered,” and “if an injured party remained ignorant of a fraud through no fault
of her own, equity could toll the statute of limitations.”34 At the “essence” of
equitable tolling was the basic premise that the “statute of limitations does not run
against a plaintiff who is unaware of his cause of action.”35 Though the early

equitable tolling has allowed the court to rely on its discretion and proceed to evaluate a resurrected
case on the merits.”). Cf. Pagan, supra note 26 (“In 1623, James I and Parliament changed the
common-law rule by enacting a statute of limitations covering most personal actions.” (citing English
Limitation Act of 1623, 21 Jac., c. 16, § 3)); Bruce A. McGovern, The New Provision for Tolling the
Limitations Periods for Seeking Tax Refunds: Its History, Operation and Policy, and Suggestions for Reform,
65 MO. L. REV. 797, 804 (2000) (“The statute of James I, from which the first American statutes of
limitations were derived, provided that if, at the time the cause of action accrued, the person entitled to
assert the claim was ‘within the age of twenty-one years, feme covert, non compos mentis, impri[s]oned or
beyond the [s]ea[s],’ then the limitations periods of the statute would not commence until the
impediment to bringing the claim had ceased.” (alteration in original) (citing 21 Jac., c. 16, § 3)).
28. Borges, 402 F.3d at 406 (quoting Lopez v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 184 F.3d 1097,
1100 (9th Cir. 1999)).
29. Morris, supra note 21. Statutes of limitations date back even further, and one fascinating
work even explored their role in Ancient Greece. See DANIELLE S. ALLEN, THE WORLD OF
PROMETHEUS: THE POLITICS OF PUNISHING IN DEMOCRATIC ATHENS 154 (2000) (“The statutes of
limitations was set at five years for all types of cases except for homicide (which had no statute
of limitations) . . . .”).
30. See generally Mark A. Wilner, Comment, Justice at the Margins: Equitable Tolling of
Washington’s Deadline for Filing Collateral Attacks on Criminal Judgments, 75 WASH. L. REV. 675,
684 (2000).
31. Id.
32. Id. (citing Booth v. Earl of Warrington (1714) 2 Eng. Rep. 111, 111).
33. See generally Morris, supra note 21.
34. Id. at 123–24.
35. Serdarevic v. Advanced Med. Optics, Inc., 532 F.3d 1352, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting
Cerbone v. Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union, 768 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1985)).
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American cases focused largely on fraud, the doctrine quickly expanded to include
other areas as well.36
The U.S. Supreme Court has largely adopted the doctrine of equitable tolling
from the English common law.37 In so doing, the Court has “followed a tradition
in which courts of equity have sought to relieve hardships, which, from time to time,
arise from a hard and fast adherence to more absolute legal rules, which, if strictly
applied, threaten the evils of archaic rigidity.”38 While identifying the need for the
courts to maintain a substantial amount of flexibility in reaching these equitable
determinations when finding “particular injustices,”39 the Court set out the two
elements that plaintiffs must satisfy to be entitled to tolling of a statutorily
prescribed timeframe: “‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and
(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and prevented
timely filing.”40
These elements make clear that the flexibility maintained by the courts to toll
a particular statute must be applied in a factually specific way to remedy injustices
that may arise.41 Plaintiffs must do their best to pursue their rights, thereby
appearing before the court with “clean hands.”42 At the same time, there must be
something “extraordinary” that occurred which prevented the claimant from
making a timely filing.43 In using this flexibility, then, the courts must balance their
36. See Morris, supra note 21, at 125 (“Once equitable tolling became available in actions at law,
its status as a purely anti-fraud device eroded.”).
37. See generally Rudolph, supra note 24, at 130; Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 650 (2010);
Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349 (1874) (“To hold that by concealing a fraud, or by
committing a fraud in a manner that it concealed itself until such time as the party committing the fraud
could plead the statute of limitations to protect it, is to make the law which was designed to prevent
fraud the means by which it is made successful and secure.”); Morris, supra note 21, at 124 (citing id.);
McGovern, supra note 27, at 806 (citing Bailey, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342).
38. Rudolph, supra note 24, at 130–31 (quoting Holland, 560 U.S. at 650).
39. Holland, 560 U.S. at 650. See generally Rudolph, supra note 24.
40. Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)).
41. The doctrines of equitable tolling and equitable estoppel are quite “distinct,” but are often
blurred. Morris, supra note 21, at 125. “Equitable estoppel retained the equitable precept that prohibits
a party from benefiting from its own improper actions . . . Equitable tolling, however, does not
necessarily require any improper action by the party against whom the time bar is to be sought. Instead,
it plays on equity’s notion of fairness from a broader perspective.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). As
the Seventh Circuit aptly articulated, “[u]nlike the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the applicability of
equitable tolling does not turn on any effort by the defendant to prevent the plaintiff from filing suit.”
Hentosh v. Herman F. Finch Univ. of Health Scis./Chi. Med. Sch., 167 F.3d 1170, 1174 (7th Cir. 1999)
(citation omitted).
42. See, e.g., Banks v. Rockwell Int’l N. Am. Aircraft Operations, 855 F.2d 324, 327 (6th
Cir. 1988) (“A cardinal maxim of equity jurisprudence is that he who comes into equity must come with
clean hands.” (citing 30 C.J.S. Equity § 93 (1965)). See generally Morris, supra note 21, at 125 (“[O]ne
could equitably toll the statute of limitations when the plaintiff, through neither any fault of her own
nor wrongdoing by the prospective defendant, was unable to bring the action in a timely fashion, so
long as a diligent effort to learn of the claim was made.”).
43. Holland, 560 U.S. at 649; cf. Developments in the Law—Statutes of Limitations, 63
HARV. L. REV. 1177, 1189 n.111 (1950) (“[T]here appears to be some degree of hostility on the part of
the judiciary where the period for bringing suit is relatively short or where the plaintiff has exercised a
reasonable degree of diligence.” (internal citation omitted)).
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efforts to avoid strict adherence to statutorily imposed timeframes with the
requirement that providing such equitable relief should only occur in extremely
limited circumstances. At its core, this doctrine centers completely around fairness
and what makes sense and is equitable in a given situation.44 This fairness is
well-grounded in constitutional principles, as restricting claimants’ access to the
courts based on timing constraints may “deprive citizens of one of the most
fundamental rights upon which our legal system is based—the right to be heard.”45
Indeed, as far back as Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court has acknowledged
that “[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”46
Given the Court’s clear articulation of the limited nature of equitable tolling,
it is not surprising that its application has been used only “sparingly” by the courts
over time.47 Nonetheless, the courts have generally accepted that, where “a litigant’s
failure to meet a legally-mandated deadline unavoidably arose from circumstances
beyond that litigant’s control,” equitable tolling of a statute may be appropriate.48
II. EQUITABLE TOLLING AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
The doctrine of equitable tolling may be particularly suitable to consider in
employment discrimination cases. After all, federal anti-discrimination law is
premised on the very idea of fairness and equality and requires that all employees
must be treated in the same manner with respect to protected status. Under Title
VII, employers must be fair to all workers, and therefore cannot differentiate on the

44. See Morris, supra note 21, at 125 (noting that equitable tolling “plays on equity’s notion of
‘fairness’ from a broader perspective”); see also Hadley Van Vactor, Shifting Sands of Claim
Accrual: John R. Sand & Gravel, Equitable Tolling, and the Suspension of Accrual in Tucker Act Cases,
62 HOW. L.J. 441, 460–61 (2019) (“In general, equitable tolling applies to toll a statute of limitations
when a litigant has pursued his rights diligently, but ‘some extraordinary circumstance prevents him
from bringing a timely action.’” (quoting CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 9 (2014))).
45. Suzette M. Malveaux, Statutes of Limitations: A Policy Analysis in the Context of Reparations
Litigation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 82 (2005). Indeed, “[t]he Supreme Court has long acknowledged
the primacy of this value, established by the United States Constitution: ‘The due process clause requires
that every man shall have the protection of his day in court, and the benefit of the general law, a law
which hears before it condemns . . . .’” Id. (alteration in original) (first quoting Truax v. Corrigan, 257
U.S. 312, 332 (1921); and then citing Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (“The fundamental
requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.”)).
46. See Malveaux, supra note 45 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)).
47. See Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (“Federal courts have typically
extended equitable relief only sparingly. We have allowed equitable tolling in situations where the
claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory
period, or where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary’s misconduct into
allowing the filing deadline to pass.”); see, e.g., Marcus, supra note 26, at 906; cf. China Agritech,
Inc. v. Resh, 138 S. Ct. 1800 (2018) (declining to apply equitable tolling in class action context). See
generally Morris, supra note 21, at 128–29; McGovern, supra note 27, at 813.
48. Steiner v. Henderson, 354 F.3d 432, 438 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Graham-Humphreys
v. Memphis Brooks Museum of Art, 209 F.3d 552, 560–61 (6th Cir. 2000)).
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basis of a protected class, which includes race, color, sex, national origin,
and religion.49
A. Time Filing Requirements for Title VII Claims
The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized the importance and value of
statutorily based limitations periods, providing that “their conclusive effects are
designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims
that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared.”50 The time limitations for satisfying the
administrative requirements of Title VII are notoriously short, further suggesting
that these time periods should be tolled in appropriate circumstances.
Under federal law, a worker who has been subjected to discriminatory
treatment in employment must bring a charge with the EEOC within either 180 or
300 days of the unlawful act, depending upon the particular state where the
discrimination takes place.51 In those states that have an equivalent fair practices
commission to the federal EEOC, the longer time period applies, likely for the
purpose of allowing the state and federal agencies time to coordinate their efforts.52
Thus, in all jurisdictions, claimants have less than a year to bring a claim of
employment discrimination under federal law.53
This time period is strikingly short. Indeed, in most personal injury cases, for
example, claimants are typically given between two and four years to bring a viable
claim.54 Where a victim of employment discrimination fails to bring a timely charge
before the EEOC, the claim cannot be considered, and any subsequent case brought
in federal court must be dismissed.55 This is true even in the most egregious cases
of employment discrimination. Thus, even where an employer may have overtly and
openly discriminated against a worker on the basis of race, sex, or another protected
category, a discrimination claim will not proceed if it has not been brought before
the EEOC within either the 180- or 300-day applicable time limit.

49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
50. Ord. of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1944).
51. 29 U.S.C. §§ 626, 633. See generally Jones v. Dillard’s, Inc., 331 F.3d 1259, 1263 (11th
Cir. 2003).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1)(B). See generally How to File a Charge of Employment Discrimination,
EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/how-file-charge-employment-discrimination
[ https://perma.cc/
RYX5-8VXM ] ( last visited Jan. 23, 2022 ).
53. 29 U.S.C. §§ 626, 633.
54. See The Supreme Court, 2001 Term—Leading Cases, 116 HARV. L. REV. 352, 356–57 (2002)
(“[W]hereas Title VII claims must be filed with the EEOC within 180 (or 300) days, individuals
bringing a tort claim can usually wait two or three years, civil RICO claimants have four years to file,
and some victims of malpractice have even longer.” (footnotes omitted)).
55. See, e.g., Abeita v. TransAmerica Mailings, Inc., 159 F.3d 246, 254 (6th Cir. 1998) (“Federal
courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear Title VII claims unless the claimant explicitly files
the claim in an EEOC charge or the claim can reasonably be expected to grow out of the
EEOC charge.”).
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While these employment time filing deadlines are inherently short, Congress
did have a viable rationale for imposing these strict time limits. From a policy
standpoint, shorter time filing deadlines for employment claims allow for employers
to become aware of the unlawful conduct and remedy it more quickly.56 In addition,
workers often change jobs, and it can be difficult to locate key witnesses in
discrimination cases if too much time has passed.57 Finally, memories quickly fade
in the workplace, as employees often change positions and encounter a number of
employment-related decisions on a daily basis—shorter time filing deadlines help
keep these memories fresh with respect to the specific adverse action alleged in the
case.58 There is also a required administrative investigation into the allegations by
the EEOC, and this process can be time-consuming in certain instances,59 thus
making an initial, quick filing beneficial to the overall time it may take to resolve a
claim. And of course, any statutorily imposed time frame will bring more “certainty”
to the resolution of the process.60
In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, the Supreme Court provided
additional guidance on these time filing guidelines with the EEOC.61 In Morgan, the
claimant alleged a number of adverse actions taken by the employer on the basis of
his race, including his wrongful suspension and subsequent termination, as well as
the company’s overall perpetration of a racially hostile work environment towards
him.62 In its clearest decision on the EEOC charge filing process and timing
requirements in these cases, the Court distinguished between “discrete acts,” like

56. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 630–31 (2007), superseded
by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5, as recognized in AT&T
Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701, 715 ( 2009) (“Th[is] short [EEOC filing] deadline reflects Congress’
strong preference for the prompt resolution of employment discrimination allegations through
voluntary conciliation and cooperation.” (citing Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432
U.S. 355, 367–68 (1977)).
57. EEOC v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 641 F. Supp. 115, 123 (S.D. Ind. 1986) (“[A]s with any other
case, as time passes, witnesses move and/or change jobs, and their memories fade.”). See generally
English v. Pabst Brewing Co., 828 F.2d 1047, 1048–49 (4th Cir. 1987) (“The limitation period facilitates
the prompt resolution of disputes upon fresh recollections. It also reflects the point at which Congress
has determined the prospect of litigation should presumptively be laid to rest.”).
58. See Gerald L. Maatman Jr. & Lily M. Strumwasser, The Tides Are Turning: EEOC Pattern
or Practice Lawsuits Must Adhere to Title VII’s 300-Day Limitation Period, 29 ABA
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 71, 84 (2014) (“Enforcing the 300-day charge-filing period serves another important
purpose: to ensure that lawsuits are filed while evidence is available, memories are recent, and witnesses
are accessible.”).
59. See Sarah David Heydemann & Sharyn Tejani, Legal Changes Needed to Strengthen the
#MeToo Movement, 22 RICH. PUB. INT. L. REV. 69, 74 (2019) (“After the charge is filled with the
EEOC, the administrative process starts. It takes, on average, about ten months for the EEOC to
investigate a charge, although some investigations can take significantly longer.” (footnote omitted)).
60. Cf. English, 828 F.2d at 1049 (“The certainty and repose these provisions confer will be lost
if their application is up for grabs in every case.”).
61. 536 U.S. 101 (2002).
62. See id. at 114–16.
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terminations, demotions, and failure to hire, with “continuing violations,” like
hostile work environments.63
With respect to isolated adverse employment decisions, the Court was clear
that where there is a discrete act like a failure to hire or promote, the claimant must
file a discrimination charge with the government within the 180/300 day time filing
window.64 Even where a timely charge is not made, however, the employer’s actions
may still come into evidence and are admissible to support a separate timely claim.65
Thus, where a claimant has suffered multiple unlawful and discrete discriminatory
acts, she may still introduce into evidence the untimely claims to help support the
timely allegations that are made.66 As the Supreme Court noted, Title VII does not
“bar an employee from using the prior acts as background evidence” in the case.67
Allegations that involve ongoing, continuing violations are treated differently,
however. These types of continuing violations typically involve discriminatory pay
decisions, where a female worker receives less than a male worker for performing
the same work under similar conditions, as well as allegations of a hostile work
environment.68 In Morgan, the Supreme Court specifically looked at the timing
requirements for a hostile work environment on the basis of race. Contrasting the
timing requirements for discrete acts, the Court held that for continuing violations,
[i]t does not matter . . . that some of the component acts of the hostile
work environment fall outside the statutory time period. Provided that an
act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time
period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for the
purposes of determining liability.69
Thus, “for the charge to be timely, the employee need only file a charge within
180 or 300 days of any act that is part of the hostile work environment.”70
This is a somewhat subtle—but important—distinction. For hostile work
environment cases, a charge is timely as long as any hostile act was committed within
the 180/300-day charge filing window.71 Even if numerous hostile acts were
committed outside of this timeframe, all of the acts are timely, admissible, and
actionable, permitted that there is at least one hostile act that occurred inside of this
window.72 This decision makes sense when the ongoing nature of hostile work
environment claims is considered. These actions are often perpetrated over long
63. Id.
64. Id. at 113.
65. Id. at 120–21.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 113.
68. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (amending 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 note). See generally Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
550 U.S. 618, 619 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2,
123 Stat. 5, as recognized in AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701, 715 ( 2009).
69. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002) (emphasis added).
70. Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 117.
72. See id.
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periods of time, and harassment claims cannot often be condensed into a single
180/300-day time period.73 For these types of ongoing discrimination claims, the
Court was more flexible when articulating the time filing deadlines. As the Court
surmised, a hostile working environment “cannot be said to occur on any particular
day. It occurs over a series of days or perhaps years and, in direct contrast to discrete
acts, a single act of harassment may not be actionable on its own.”74
The Morgan decision is helpful from a policy standpoint as well, as it can be
difficult for workers to identify precisely when a hostile working environment has
occurred, and to fully understand the exact timing requirements of bringing the
claim with the government. Indeed, if a worker files her hostile work environment
claim too early, when not enough adverse events have occurred to support the
claim, it can result in the dismissal of the case.75 The Court’s flexible approach to
the hostile work environment time filing deadlines is thus sound public policy, as
well as a correct interpretation of the statute.
B. Morgan on Equitable Tolling
In an important portion of the Morgan decision, the Supreme Court addressed
the concerns that a worker might unfairly or unnecessarily cause a delay in a hostile
work environment case, particularly given the flexible approach that the Court took
to the timing requirements in these claims discussed above.76 The Court highlighted
that there may be certain defenses for employers in these situations and specifically
looked to the doctrine of equitable tolling.77 The Court noted that its decision “does
not leave employers defenseless against employees who bring hostile work
environment claims that extend over long periods of time” and stated that a
business would still “have recourse when a plaintiff unreasonably delays filing a
charge.”78 Looking to its prior case law, the Court noted that the Title VII time
filing deadline “is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing” a claim.79 Instead, “it
is a requirement subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling ‘when equity
so requires.’”80
Most importantly, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]hese equitable doctrines
allow us to honor Title VII’s remedial purpose without negating the particular
purpose of the filing requirement, to give prompt notice to the employer.”81 This
statement makes clear that equity should be taken into account when applying Title

73. See, e.g., Ledbetter, 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
74. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 115. As the Court noted, hostile work
environment claims “are based on the cumulative effect of individual acts.” Id. (emphasis added).
75. See generally Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001).
76. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 117.
77. Id. at 117–21.
78. Id. at 121.
79. See id.
80. See id. (citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982)).
81. See id. (quoting Zipes, 455 U.S. at 398).
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VII’s time filing deadlines.82 In particular, the Court notes that the application of
equitable tolling may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of Title VII.83
While these remarks in Morgan were made with respect to an employer’s
defenses to the time filing deadlines for hostile work environment claims, the
broader and more important takeaway of the statement is that fairness is an
important consideration when looking at the employment discrimination charge
filing requirements. Fairness runs both ways, and equitable considerations and
fairness must be taken into account by the courts for both parties to give full effect
to Title VII’s purposes.84 As the Court further noted, “the federal courts have the
discretionary power . . . to locate ‘a just result’ in light of the circumstances peculiar
to the case.”85 When it comes to the application of Title VII’s time filing deadlines,
then, assuring a “just result” is the most important overall consideration. The
Supreme Court in Morgan could not have been any clearer on this point.
The Morgan decision comports with one of the more well-known cases in this
area, Zipes v. TWA,86 where the Supreme Court addressed the general nature of the
filing deadlines in federal employment discrimination cases. In Zipes, the Supreme
Court considered a case which involved the timeliness of a Title VII gender lawsuit
alleging that an airline’s policy of prohibiting new mothers (but not new fathers)
from working as flight attendants constituted sex discrimination.87 The Court held,
for the first time, that the timeliness of filing a discrimination charge with the
government in such a case is not jurisdictional, and thus these statutory time periods
are “subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.”88 Like in Morgan, the Supreme
Court in Zipes emphasized that by allowing the filing period for discrimination
charges to be subject to a doctrine such as equitable tolling, the Court was balancing
“the remedial purpose of [Title VII] as a whole” with the need to provide sufficient
notice of the claim to the defendant.89 Looking to the policy of the legislation, the
Court referenced one of its earlier decisions, Love v. Pullman Co.,90 where it had
“[d]eclin[ed] to read literally another filing provision” of the statute and had
“explained that a technical reading would be ‘particularly inappropriate in a statutory
scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process.’”91 The

82. See id.
83. See id.
84. Cf. Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 560 (2000) (“[F]ederal statutes of limitations are generally
subject to equitable principles of tolling . . . .”).
85. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 121 (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 424 (1975), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071,
as recognized in Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 578 (2009)).
86. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982).
87. Id. at 388.
88. Id. at 393 (emphasis added). The Court held that this result was supported by “[t]he structure
of Title VII, the congressional policy underlying it, and the reasoning of our cases.” Id.
89. Id. at 398.
90. Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
91. Zipes, 455 U.S. at 397 (quoting Love, 404 U.S. at 527).
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Court ultimately held that this “principle must be applied here.”92 The Supreme
Court in Zipes, just like in Morgan, was thus quite clear that equity must be addressed
when applying Title VII’s time filing requirements and that tolling should be
considered in appropriate circumstances.93
C. Equitable Tolling of Discrimination Claims in the Federal Courts
As discussed above, the Morgan decision was clear that equity and “a just
result” must be considered when applying Title VII’s time filing requirements.94
This is particularly important for Title VII claims because, as the Supreme Court
noted in both Zipes and Love, employees themselves may frequently be the ones
filing the charge, often without the assistance of counsel at this early stage of the
process.95 While application of equitable tolling to Title VII claims is somewhat
limited,96 there are nonetheless numerous examples of the federal courts applying
this doctrine in the employment discrimination context. This Part explores some of
the more notable and descriptive examples of the application of equitable tolling by
the courts. While this discussion of the case law is not exhaustive, it does present
the primary considerations the courts have looked to when applying this doctrine
in the workplace context. Thus, there are certain identifiable considerations the
courts have highlighted when applying equitable tolling to cases involving sexually
harassing behavior by an employer or its agents.97
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 121 (2002). See generally Morris, supra
note 21, at 130 (“It is clear that federal statutes can in certain circumstances be equitably tolled.
Importantly, this can happen even without fraud or concealment on the defendant’s part. The courts
are willing to apply the equitable construct where fairness so dictates.”).
95. See Zipes, 455 U.S. at 397 (quoting Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972)).
96. Cf. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 536 U.S. at 113 (“Courts may evaluate whether it would be
proper to apply such doctrines, although they are to be applied sparingly.”); Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans
Affs., 498 U.S. 89, 90 (1990) (“Federal courts have typically extended equitable relief only sparingly in
suits against private litigants . . . .”); Robinson v. Schafer, 305 F. App’x 629, 631 (11th Cir. 2008) (per
curiam) (noting “the rare remedy of equitable tolling”). As one scholar summarized: “Federal courts
often toll the statutory limitations period on a number of bases. Tolling often applies where
either: (1) the worker filed suit in the wrong forum; or (2) the worker requested appointment of counsel
(tolled during adjudication of eligibility); or (3) the worker asked to proceed as a pauper (tolled during
adjudication of eligibility); or (4) the employer concealed relevant facts from the worker; or (5) the
EEOC misled the worker. Some federal circuits also toll where (6) the relevant state agency made an
error that prevented the worker from filing on time. Others toll where (6) attorney error caused the
filing delay; and they may toll where (7) an unsophisticated plaintiff fails to understand filing
requirements. Still others toll where (6) the worker filed prematurely in an attempt to preserve her
rights; and where (7) the worker, proceeding pro se, was misled by defense counsel about filing
requirements.” Rudolph, supra note 24, at 137–38 (citations omitted).
97. Santiago v. SEPTA, No. 13-5411, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64370, at *19 (E.D. Pa. May 15,
2015) (“(1) where the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff’s cause of action;
(2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights;
or (3) where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights mistakenly in the wrong forum.” (quoting
Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1387 (3d Cir. 1994), overruled in irrelevant
part by Rotkiske v. Klemm, 890 F.3d 422, 428 (3rd Cir. 2018) (en banc))).
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Emotional Distress. One area where the courts have explored the doctrine of
equitable tolling in the workplace has been where the employer’s conduct is so
severe that it has resulted in extreme distress to the employee and an inability to file
a timely claim. Victims of sexual harassment may find themselves so badly treated,
or even assaulted, that filing a claim within 300 days proves difficult, if
not impossible.
In perhaps one of the best-known decisions in this area, Stoll v. Runyon,98 the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied equitable tolling principles to a
sexual harassment case brought under Title VII. The plaintiff in that case worked
in letter sorting at the Sacramento Post Office for six years.99 During this time, she
was subjected to grotesque sexual abuse by her coworkers and supervisors.100
Indeed, despite her efforts to avoid him, one supervisor even “raped her
repeatedly.”101 The abusive conditions forced the plaintiff to leave her employment
with the postal facility.102 As a result of this conduct, the plaintiff was “scarred for
life,” suffering severe depression, anxiety, and a pain disorder, and she attempted
suicide multiple times.103 Communication for the plaintiff became difficult, as she
developed “anxiety and fear of anything to do with the Post Office,”104 and it was
determined that the plaintiff was “totally psychiatrically disabled.”105
The plaintiff filed a claim for sexual harassment under Title VII, but she failed
to follow the time filing requirements.106 The court concluded that there was
“overwhelming” evidence that equitable tolling should apply, as she had established
“wrongful conduct” by the employer, as well as “extraordinary circumstances
beyond [her] control” that made filing a timely claim impossible.107 In applying the
doctrine, the court held that “if ever equity demanded tolling a statute of limitations,
it does so here,”108 as the employer “[i]s not entitled to benefit from the fact that
its own admittedly outrageous acts left [plaintiff] so broken and damaged that she
cannot protect her own rights . . . [plaintiff’s] mental incapacity . . . is an

98. 165 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 1999).
99. Id. at 1239.
100. Id. (“Numerous male coworkers and supervisors asked Stoll to perform oral sex on them,
commented on her body, shot rubber bands at her backside, asked her to wear lacy black underwear
for them, bumped and rubbed up against her from behind, pressed their erect penises into her back
while she was sorting mail and unable to get away, followed her into the women’s bathroom, asked her
to go on vacations, ‘stalked her throughout the postal facility,’ and fondled her body.”).
101. Id. at 1239–40.
102. Id. at 1240.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1241. In this case, the defendant “asserted that Stoll’s Title VII claim should be
dismissed because Stoll did not file her pro se complaint until more than a year after the [EEOC’s]
decision letter was received by her counsel, which was well past the 90-day limitation period.” Id.
107. Id. at 1242.
108. Id.
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‘extraordinary circumstance’ beyond her control.’”109 Thus, in finding the
application of equitable tolling appropriate for the plaintiff’s sexual harassment
claims, the court emphasized the wrongful nature of the employer’s conduct, the
extraordinary circumstances which existed in the case preventing plaintiff from
filing a timely claim, as well as the severe emotional distress (and even mental
incapacity) that the plaintiff suffered as a result of the actions of the defendant.110
In a much more recent case brought in a federal district court in Washington,
D.C., the court explained how the equitable tolling doctrine may be applicable to
tort-based claims where the employer’s alleged sexual harassment resulted in a
worker’s strong emotional distress. In Kennedy v. Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc.,111
the court examined allegations that the plaintiff, a woman who had secured
employment as a laborer with the defendant construction company after previously
living in a homeless shelter, was harassed, assaulted, and raped by this employer
over the course of her six weeks of employment.112
The specific allegations in the case were chilling and involved inappropriate
conduct by the superintendent of the construction worksite that included improper
non-consensual rubbing and exposure, forced oral sex on multiple occasions, as
well as forced penetration.113 The superintendent terminated the plaintiff and also
misrepresented the nature of his interactions with her to other company workers,
who openly mocked her when they subsequently encountered the plaintiff.114 As a
result of this conduct and the assaults, the plaintiff began having suicidal thoughts,
became severely depressed, and was ultimately hospitalized with a diagnosis of
post-traumatic stress disorder.115 The plaintiff filed numerous claims against the
employer approximately twenty-one months after the alleged rape occurred.116 With
respect to the timeliness of these claims, the court declined to dismiss the allegations
given the possibility that the plaintiff was “mentally incapacitated for most of the
year between the . . . rape and her retention of counsel.”117 The plaintiff “had
trouble performing basic life functions in the aftermath of [the abuse and,] for now
at least, these allegations are sufficient to sustain her claims.”118

109. Id. (“Equitable tolling is permitted even where a plaintiff has a lawyer if the interests of
justice so require and there is no prejudice to the defendant.” (citing Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick
Assoc. Ltd., 507 U.S. 380, 397 (1993)).
110. See id. at 1242–43. Beyond the plaintiff, the conditions for all women at this postal facility
represented “a glaring situation no one should have to endure.” Id. at 1240 (internal quotations omitted).
111. Kennedy v. Berkel & Co. Contractors, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 3d 236 (D.D.C. 2018).
112. Id. at 241.
113. Id. at 242–43.
114. Id. at 243.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 250. While the court here appears to consider the timeliness of tort claims, given the
workplace nature of these allegations, the same equitable standards would apply to harassment
allegations brought under Title VII.
117. Id. at 251.
118. Id. at 252.
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These two cases certainly present obvious examples of where equitable tolling
is appropriate in cases of sexual discrimination under federal law. Nonetheless,
while the courts were willing to toll the applicable statutory time period in these
decisions, the case law is still replete with other instances where the federal courts
have found the evidence insufficient to toll the time periods in hostile work
environment cases based on emotional distress.119
Threatening Behavior. Another area where some courts have been willing to take
a flexible approach to the time filing requirements in harassment cases involves
those instances where the employer has made direct or indirect threats to the
worker. These types of threats can unreasonably prevent victimized workers from
seeking appropriate relief with the EEOC or in the courts.
One example of these types of threats occurred in EEOC v. Willamette Tree
Wholesale, Inc.,120 a case arising in federal court in Oregon. In that case, one
employee worked at Willamette Tree where she was allegedly raped repeatedly by a
supervisor of the company.121 These rapes were violent, and the supervisor
“repeatedly threatened to kill and/or harm [the employee] and her family
members . . . if she ever reported the rapes to anyone.”122 This supervisor further
threatened to fire some of her coworkers if she reported the assaults, and “if she
quit her job he would find her and harm her.”123 After the termination of her
employment, the supervisor continued to call her and “reiterat[e] his threats to harm
her and her family should she report the assaults.”124
The worker’s discrimination charge filed with the EEOC occurred 362 days
following her final day of employment, making the charge untimely.125 Given the
overwhelmingly horrific facts involved, however, the plaintiffs argued that equitable
tolling was appropriate.126 The court accepted this argument, applying the tolling
doctrine to the discrimination claim.127 In reaching this result, the court relied upon
the severe emotional and psychological harm caused by the employer,128 as well as
the supervisor’s “repeated threats to harm [her] and her family should she disclose
119. See, e.g., Peart v. Latham & Watkins LLP, 985 F. Supp. 2d 72, 86 (D.D.C. 2013); Goodman
v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & New Jersey, 850 F. Supp. 2d 363, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Springs v. Bd. of Educ.,
No. 10 Civ. 01243(RJH), 2010 WL 4068712, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2010); Powers v. United States,
Case No.: 16-13668, 2020 WL 4587415 at *10 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 6, 2020); Holt v. City of Dickinson of
Tenn., No. 3:14-cv-1985, 2015 WL 6619969 at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 30, 2015); Cf. Rudolph, supra note
24, at 138 (“It is unsurprising . . . that courts regard cases alleging that mental incapacity prevented a
timely filing with some skepticism.”).
120. No. CV 09-690, 2011 WL 886402 (D. Or. Mar. 14, 2011).
121. Id. at *2.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at *3.
125. Id. at *6.
126. Id. at *7.
127. Id. at *8.
128. Id. (noting that the psychological impact to the victim included “severe depression,
post-traumatic stress, suicidal ideation, social isolation and panic attacks, all exacerbated by any
reminder of the sexual assaults, including being called upon to report or describe her experiences”).
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the sexual assaults to anyone.”129 In sum, the court looked to the extensive
emotional harm caused by the employer, but also relied heavily on specific threats
of physical harm made by the supervisor involved, in deciding to pause the statutory
filing period under Title VII.
In Koppman v. South Central Bell Telephone Co.,130 the court examined more
generally the question of whether employer threats are sufficient to toll the
administrative charge filing period for a Title VII employment discrimination claim
brought under federal law.131 In analyzing the question, the court looked to policy
rationales to conclude that employer threats should be sufficient to pause the clock
for filing a timely claim.132 The court held that “[t]here is no logical reason to
distinguish between a defendant who induces an employee to forgo filing an EEOC
claim by misleading her from a defendant who achieves the same end by threatening
her.”133 The court noted that any other result “would encourage potential
defendants to threaten potential claimants for six months until their claims
prescribe.”134 Just like in the Willamette Tree decision, then, the court was clear that
it would be inequitable to reward an employer whose threats caused a plaintiff’s
delay in filing a timely employment discrimination claim under Title VII. The court
here was even more clear that as a matter of policy, employer threats should be
considered as an independent basis for tolling the statutory time filing periods of
Title VII so as not to create perverse incentives for employers to engage in this
inappropriate conduct.135
While not all threats will be deemed sufficient to pause the time filing periods
for federal employment discrimination claims, this type of improper employer
behavior is an area where the courts have been willing to at least consider equitable
tolling.136 Whether a court would be willing to accept an employer’s threats as
sufficient to toll a particular claim would very much depend on the jurisdiction and
factual scenario at issue.
Employer Deception. As suggested by the Koppman decision, one additional area
where the courts have looked when considering equitable tolling in the workplace
context has been with respect to employer deception and misrepresentations.137

129. Id. The court also found it important that the victim “was at all material times a
monolingual, illiterate Spanish speaker unrepresented by legal counsel.” Id.
130. No. 90-4503, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9115 (E.D. La. June 16, 1992).
131. See id. at *36–37.
132. Id. at *37–38.
133. Id. at *37.
134. Id. at *37–38.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., Chawla v. Emory Univ., No. Civ. A. 95CV0750JOF, 1997 WL 907571, at *4
(N.D. Ga. Mar. 31, 1997); see also Moses v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 818 F. Supp. 1287, 1290
(D. Ariz. 1993).
137. Koppman, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9115, at *37 (“The typical equitable estoppel scenario is
where the defendant misleads the plaintiff or conceals facts so as to cause the plaintiff not to assert her
rights within the statutory period . . . where the employer causes the employee to file late, modification
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These types of cases typically involve an employer’s intentional
misrepresentation(s)138 to an employee which causes or encourages the worker to
miss the relevant time filing deadline under the employment discrimination
statute.139 It has long been recognized that tolling may be appropriate “where the
facts show that the defendant engaged in conduct, often itself fraudulent, that
concealed from the plaintiff the existence of the cause of action.”140 If the courts
allowed this form of deception, it would only encourage this type of unlawful
employer behavior.141 As Justice Black famously stated, “no man may take
advantage of his own wrong . . . equity courts [have] frequently been employed to
bar inequitable reliance on statutes of limitation.”142 Employer deception and
misrepresentations are thus among the more common areas where the courts
have accepted the doctrine of equitable tolling for Title VII employment
discrimination claims.
For example, in Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc.,143 the federal
appellate court held that the statutory period144 for a Title VII employment
discrimination claim did not begin “until the facts that would support a charge of
discrimination under Title VII were apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent
regard for his rights similarly situated to the plaintiff.”145 The court’s analysis
focused on the impact of potential deception and misleading statements, noting that
“employers that discriminate undoubtedly often attempt to cloak their policies with
a semblance of rationality,” and this improper conduct may thus “seek to convey to
the victim of their policies an air of neutrality or even sympathy.”146 It is therefore
possible that this conduct might “extend to the giving of misleading or false
information to the victim.”147 The court was clear that where the allegations involve
the “wrongful concealment of facts,” an employer that is “responsible for such
wrongful concealment is estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as
a defense.”148
In a similar case, Santiago v. SEPTA,149 the plaintiff in the matter, a female
lieutenant working for the state transit police, asserted that her supervisor “climbed

of the filing requirement is necessary to effect the remedial purpose of the employment
discrimination statutes.”).
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. Cerbone v. Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union, 768 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1985).
141. See Koppman, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9115.
142. Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232–33 (1959).
143. 516 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1975).
144. In this particular case at the time, the relevant statutory period was ninety days. Id. at 926.
145. Id. at 931. In the case, the plaintiff argued that her employer “actively sought to mislead
her,” and that “the facts that would alert a reasonable person to the unlawful discrimination only
became known to the plaintiff more than six months after the discriminatory act.” Id. at 930.
146. Id. at 931.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 930.
149. No. 135411, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64370 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 2015).
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on top of her, groping and kissing her.”150 She further alleged that subsequent
workplace abuse by this supervisor included “unwanted touching and groping, and
nonconsensual sexual intercourse.”151 The plaintiff raised the matter with the
Director of the agency’s EEO office, who the plaintiff alleged had “misled” her by
not “explaining the consequences of not filing” a discrimination charge with the
state and federal government.152 The court concluded that the EEOC director’s
information given to the plaintiff was “best characterized as a misrepresentation of
omission—that is, [the Director] told Plaintiff that she could file, which was true,
but did not tell her the critical detail that she must file if she wanted to preserve her
statutory rights.”153 Thus, according to the court, it was a reasonable inference that
this information “actively misled Plaintiff, causing her to believe she had no need
to preserve her claims outside of [the agency’s] own process.”154 The court therefore
agreed to equitably toll the time filing period as a result of the misleading statements
provided to the plaintiff with respect to the proper charge filing requirements.155
Like Reeb and Santiago, numerous other courts have made clear that deceptive
practices or material misrepresentations may be sufficient to toll the statutory time
file period in discrimination cases.156
Where misrepresentation or deception have been found sufficient to toll the
statute, courts often apply a discovery rule in determining how long the statutory
time filing period should pause.157 Under this rule, the statute of limitations would

150. Id. at *1. This case also involved threatening behavior, as “Plaintiff told [her supervisor]
that she wanted to report this incident, but he told her that if she did so, she ‘would no longer have a
job.’” Id.
151. Id. at *3.
152. Id. at *20. The court emphasized that the “critical question” was whether the EEO
Director “‘actively misled’ Plaintiff by telling her that she could file a claim with the EEOC and PHRC
if she wanted to and by failing to explain to her the consequences of not filing such a claim.” Id.
153. Id. at *20.
154. Id. at *21. The court expressly held that by examining “these facts in the light most
favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that McKenzie’s statement—though less active than
other misleading statements might have been—was indeed a misrepresentation that directly led Plaintiff
to believe she had no need to file a claim with outside agencies.” Id. at *20–21.
155. Id. The tolling question in this particular case looked at claims brought under Pennsylvania
state law. Id. at *2–4.
156. See, e.g., Jense v. Runyon, 990 F. Supp. 1320, 1327 (D. Utah 1998) (“[Plaintiff] has created
a material factual dispute over whether she is entitled to equitable tolling given that the written posters
did not contain the information required by regulation and, in the case of [the] sexual harassment poster,
may have been affirmatively misleading.”); Biester v. Midwest Health Servs., Inc., 77 F.3d 1264, 1267
(10th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Tenth Circuit has generally recognized equitable tolling of Title VII time
limitations only if the circumstances of the case rise to the level of active deception which might invoke
the powers of equity to toll the limitations period.”); Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38
F.3d 1380, 1391–92 (3d Cir. 1994), aff’d, 96 F.3d 1434 (3d Cir. 1996) (“A fair reading of [plaintiff’s]
complaint is that she claims that the firm told her there was no work when ‘apparently there was . . .,’
a fact which she learned for the first time much later . . . these allegations, taken as true . . . are
sufficient to activate the doctrine of equitable tolling.”).
157. Justice Ginsburg opined on the distinction between equitable tolling and “the fraud-based
discovery rule.” Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 363 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). She stated
that “‘[e]quitable tolling’ describes a doctrine that pauses, or ‘tolls,’ a statutory limitations period after
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not start to run in an employment discrimination case “until the facts which would
support the plaintiff’s cause of action are apparent, or should be apparent to a
person with a reasonably prudent regard for his or her rights.”158 Thus, tolling of
the relevant statute would continue until the plaintiff discovered the facts necessary
to support the cause of action or until a reasonable person would have recognized
that they had a viable claim.159 This discovery rule is an equitable modification of
the time filing periods in discrimination cases.160
III. THE FIVE GUIDEPOSTS OF EQUITABLE TOLLING
Despite the cases discussed above, the federal courts have declined to apply
the doctrine of equitable tolling to sexual harassment claims in the overwhelming
number of instances where it has been sought.161 In light of what we now know
from the #MeToo movement, and the extraordinary efforts made by employers to

it has commenced. . . . By contrast, the fraud-based discovery rule sets the time at which a claim accrues,
i.e., the time when the statute of limitations commences to run.” Id. at 363–64 (citations omitted).
Though Justice Ginsburg was correct that the two theories “are often blended or confused,” id. at 363,
they are used synonymously in this paper which looks primarily at which indicia or guideposts the courts
should be looking to when considering whether a Title VII claim should be considered timely. See infra
Part IV (discussing factors for courts to consider when applying time deadlines in harassment cases).
158. Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1389. The court noted that a number of other federal appellate courts
had taken the same approach in applying the discovery rule to tolling in cases involving
misrepresentation by a defendant, citing Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924 (5th
Cir. 1975), Vaught v. Railroad Donnelley & Sons Co., 745 F.2d 407, 410–12 (7th Cir. 1984), Wilkerson
v. Siegfried Insurance Agency, Inc., 683 F.2d 344, 345–46 (10th Cir. 1982), and Miranda v. B & B Cash
Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1531–32 (11th Cir. 1992).
159. See, e.g., Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1389 (“[W]here the plaintiff has been actively misled regarding
the reason for his or her discharge, the equitable tolling doctrine provides the plaintiff with the full
statutory limitations period, starting from the date the facts supporting the plaintiff’s cause of action
either become apparent to the plaintiff or should have become apparent to a person in the plaintiff’s
position with a reasonably prudent regard for his or her rights.”); Brown v. Lankenau Hosp.,
No. 95-7829, 1996 WL 257353, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 1996) (“[B]y giving Plaintiff false information
about the availability of positions . . . Defendant’s actions equitably tolled the limitations period.
Equitable tolling of the limitations period is appropriate where the employer’s own acts lulled plaintiff
into foregoing prompt action on his/her claim.”).
160. Cf. Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 363 (2019) (“[T]his Court long ago ‘adopted as its
own the old chancery rule that where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and remains in ignorance of
it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of the statute [of limitations] does
not begin to run until the fraud is discovered. . . . [T]he fraud-based discovery rule operates as a
statutory presumption ‘read into every federal statute of limitation.’” (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946) (citing Bailey
v. Glover, 21 Wall. 342, 347, 22 L. Ed. 636 (1875))); TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001)
(declining to apply discovery rule to 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)).
161. See, e.g., Miller v. Downtown Bid Servs. Corp., 281 F. Supp. 3d 15, 22 (D.D.C. 2017);
Shareef v. McHugh, No. 16-00509 ACK-KJM, 2017 WL 754326, at *8 (D. Haw. Feb. 27, 2017);
Sapienza v. Castellon, No. 14-974-LPS, 2016 WL 1212132, at *4–5 (D. Del. Mar. 28, 2016); Hentosh
v. Herman M. Finch Univ. of Health Scis./Chi. Med. Sch., 167 F.3d 1170, 1175 (7th Cir. 1999); Dyson
v. D.C., 710 F.3d 415, 422 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Newell v. Mnuchin, No. 17-2695, 2020 WL 136648, at *24
(D.D.C. Jan. 13, 2020); Byrd v. D.C., 807 F. Supp. 2d 37, 61 (D.D.C. 2011); Belton v. City of Charlotte,
175 F. App’x 641, 654 (4th Cir. 2006); Huff v. Bd. of Governors of N.C., 334 F. App’x 583, 584 (4th
Cir. 2009).
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conceal their own harassment, this result must change. As the courts in this country
recognized early on, “the essence of the doctrine [of equitable tolling] ‘is that a
statute of limitations does not run against a plaintiff who is unaware of his cause of
action.’”162 Even the earliest decisions in this area generally acknowledged that
when there has been no negligence or laches on the part of a plaintiff in
coming to the knowledge of the fraud which is the foundation of the suit,
and when the fraud has been concealed, or is of such character as to
conceal itself, the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is
discovered by, or becomes known to, the party suing.163
The #MeToo movement has revealed the true nature of the unlawful conduct
of employers, and these same employers should not be permitted to benefit from
their improper actions by concealing or running out the clock on hostile work
environment claims.
This Part explores the origins of the #MeToo movement, as well as the recent
research related to sexual harassment claims. This Part further identifies several core
guideposts that the courts should look to when determining whether to apply
equitable tolling to a harassment charge filed outside of the statutorily
prescribed period.
A. The #MeToo Movement
Much has been written on the #MeToo movement, and scholars continue to
produce important and critical academic literature with respect to sexual harassment
in the workplace.164 This Article cannot review all that valuable work, but it is
important to briefly examine the overarching purposes of the #MeToo
movement—and where we are today—for purposes of the analysis here.
While sexual harassment has long been a persistent problem in this country,165
the #MeToo movement is much more recent.166 This movement grew on social
162. Serdarevic v. Advanced Med. Optics, Inc., 532 F.3d 1352, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (alteration
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted) (quoting Cerbone v. Int’l Ladies’
Garment Workers Union, 768 F.2d 45, 48 (2d Cir. 1985)).
163. Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 349–50 (1874); Morris, supra note 21, at 124 (citing Bailey,
88 U.S. 342); McGovern, supra note 27, at 806 (citing Bailey, 88 U.S. 342).
164. See generally Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 YALE
L.J.F. 22 (2018); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Beyond #MeToo, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1146 (2019); Deborah
L. Rhode, #MeToo: Why Now? What Next?, 69 DUKE L.J. 377 (2019); Elizabeth C. Tippett, The Legal
Implications of the MeToo Movement, 103 MINN. L. REV. 229 (2018); Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory
Arbitration Stymies Progress Towards Justice in Employment Law: Where To, #MeToo?, 54
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155 (2019).
165. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Introduction: A Short History of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS
IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 1, 3 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004) (“The
practice of sexual harassment is centuries old—at least, if we define sexual harassment as unwanted
sexual relations imposed by superiors on subordinates at work.”).
166. See Elliott v. Donegan, 469 F. Supp. 3d 40, 51 (E.D.N.Y. 2020) (“#MeToo catapulted
into the public’s consciousness in October 2017.”); Hardwick v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., Inc.,
No. 15-cv-01161-JMS-DML, 2018 WL 4620252, at *15 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 26, 2018) (“In early October
2017 #MeToo became an internet phenomenon, a ‘viral awareness campaign that inspired millions of
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media as a way of spreading awareness about sexual harassment, as well as sexual
assault and abuse.167 One of the primary purposes of this important campaign
involved the workplace component of sexual harassment, which included both
employees’ experiences with hostile work environments as well as with sexual
assaults.168 While the #MeToo movement has seen headlines related to a number
of high-profile celebrities, including Alyssa Milano, Reese Witherspoon and
Jennifer Lawrence,169 hundreds of thousands of women have added their voices to
this movement in recent months, and stories of widespread sexual assault have
reached all corners of the economy.170 Indeed, the #MeToo movement quickly
expanded beyond the United States to all parts of the world.171 While the
entertainment, technology, and banking sectors are some of the more prevalent
areas where sexual discrimination and harassment are found in the workplace, all
industries have faced valid criticism for failing to appropriately respond to hostile
work environment claims.172 Though the #MeToo movement started out primarily

posts on Facebook and Twitter’ after dozens of women spoke out against the sexual misconduct of
Harvey Weinstein.” (quoting Abby Ohlheiser, Meet the Woman Who Coined ‘Me Too’ 10 Years Ago - to
Help Women of Color, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 19, 2017, 11:55 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/
lifestyles/ct-me-too-campaign-origins-20171019-story.html [ http://web.archive.org/web/202106280
85754/https://www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/ct-me-too-campaign-origins-20171019-story.html ])).
In 2006, Tarana Burke founded the ‘me too.’ movement to help survivors of sexual violence heal. See
History & Inception, ME TOO., https://metoomvmt.org/get-to-know-us/history-inception/ [ https://
perma.cc/Q4JK-NECE ] ( last visited Feb. 12, 2022 ) (describing Tarana Burke’s work centering
survivors and “disrupt[ing] the systems that allow sexual violence to proliferate in our world.”). The
#MeToo hashtag became popular much later following a tweet from Alyssa Milano. See generally Tarana
Burke, I Founded ‘Me Too’ in 2006. The Morning It Went Viral Was a Nightmare, TIME (Sept. 14,
2021, 2:51 PM), https://time.com/6097392/tarana-burke-me-too-unbound-excerpt/ [ https://web.
archive.org/web/20220126013840/https://time.com/6097392/tarana-burke-me-too-unbound-excerpt/ ].
167. See, e.g., Elliott, 469 F. Supp. 3d at 51–52 (“On October 15, 2017, actor Alyssa Milano
wrote on Twitter, ‘if you’ve been sexually harassed or assaulted write “me too” as a reply to this tweet.’
Within days, thousands heeded her call. And thus, the voices of few became many, and the #MeToo
movement became a chorus bolstering the credibility of victims of sexual assault and harassment.”).
168. See Bonnie Marcus, What Women Can Do to Successfully Navigate the Workplace Post
#MeToo, FORBES ( June 13, 2019, 1:45 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bonniemarcus/2019/06/
13/what-women-can-do-to-successfully-navigate-the-workplace-post-metoo/#12aeb1a64e95 [ https://
perma.cc/3WUV-6AGA ] (“Since the resurgence of #MeToo in 2017, there has been a lot of media
attention to the issue of sexual harassment and abuse in the workplace.”).
169. See, e.g., Joyce Chen, Alyssa Milano Wants Her “Me Too” Campaign to Elevate Harvey
Weinstein Discussion, ROLLING STONE (Oct. 17, 2017, 5:05 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/
movies/movie-news/alyssa-milano-wants-her-me-too-campaign-to-elevate-harvey-weinstein-discussion
-123610/ [ https://perma.cc/7K4M-JLMQ ] (discussing celebrity involvement in the #MeToo movement).
170. See Benedetta Faedi Duramy, #MeToo and the Pursuit of Women’s International Human
Rights, 54 U.S.F. L. REV. 215, 217 (2020) (“Within twenty-four hours, the hashtag had been posted
nearly a million times.”).
171. See Catherine Powell, How #MeToo Has Spread Like Wildfire Around the World,
NEWSWEEK (Dec. 15, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/how-metoo-has-spread-wildfirearound-world-749171 [ https://perma.cc/KP3E-2XS2 ] (“Besides hitting Hollywood, media, politics,
national security, and other sectors, the movement has rapidly spread across the world—a mirror of
the numerous women’s marches across the globe this past January. By early November, #MeToo had
been tweeted 2.3 million times from eight[y]-five different countries.”).
172. See generally id.
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as a way for women to raise these concerns, many men—including several
celebrities—have also added their voices.173
Fundamentally, the #MeToo movement began as a way for women to share
their experiences with sexual abuse, thereby allowing others to feel more
comfortable speaking out as well, and to spread awareness of how deep of a
problem sexual harassment and assault have been—and continue to be—in our
society.174 Indeed, it was estimated that “in its first six months the #MeToo
movement led to the reporting of 26,371 additional sex crimes.”175 All industries
have proven to be woefully problematic in this area, and prior to #MeToo, there
was an unfortunate lack of understanding of the hostile experiences women were
encountering every day at work in this country and around the world.176
At its core, then, #MeToo has performed several important functions,
perhaps the most critical of which has been educational in nature.177 By raising
awareness across the board on this issue, both men and women now have a much
better understanding and grasp of the problem, though much work remains to be
done in this area. Importantly, employees now are aware that they are not alone
when they face harassment, and workers across all sectors of the economy have
weighed in to share their experiences with this type of abuse. Through education
and awareness, #MeToo has done much to change the way our society and culture
view sexual harassment in the workplace.178 Recent research has even demonstrated

173. See, e.g., Mahita Gajanan, ‘This Happened to Me Too.’ Terry Crews Details His Alleged Sexual
Assault During Emotional Senate Testimony, TIME ( June 26, 2018, 4:18 PM), https://time.com/
5322629/terry-crews-sexual-assault-senate-committee/ [ https://web.archive.org/web/20210514155653/
https://time.com/5322629/terry-crews-sexual-assault-senate-committee/ ] (“Crews said . . . ‘And I
chose to tell my story and share my experience to stand in solidarity with millions of other survivors
around the world. That I know how hard it is to come forward. I know the shame associated with
the assault.’”).
174. See Duramy, supra note 170, at 217 (describing early stages of the #MeToo movement).
175. Ro’ee Levy & Martin Mattsson, The Effects of Social Movements: Evidence from
#MeToo 23 (August 6, 2021) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3496903 [ https://perma.cc/Y4P7-AJU4 ]. See Mark Morales, #MeToo Cited as One Reason
Rape Reports Increased 22% in New York in 2018, CNN ( Jan. 3, 2019, 7:07 PM) (“Reports of rape in
New York were up 22% in 2018, in part because the #MeToo movement inspired victims to come
forward and tell their stories.”), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/03/us/nypd-crime-statsbriefing/index.html [ https://perma.cc/HKU6-BEB5 ].
176. See Sarah Beaulieu, 4 Conversations Leaders in the #MeToo Era Should Be Ready For,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 12, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/08/4-conversations-leaders-in-the-metooera-should-be-ready-for [ https://perma.cc/8CCK-ARX7 ] (“The #MeToo movement broke the
silence on sexual harassment in the workplace, inspiring leaders in every industry to reckon with their
organization’s culture—and their own behavior—to build a work environment that’s safe and
supportive for everyone.”).
177. See Alia E. Dastagir, It’s Been Two Years Since the #MeToo Movement Exploded. Now
What?, USA TODAY (Sept. 30, 2019, 6:00 AM) https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/
2019/09/30/me-too-movement-women-sexual-assault-harvey-weinstein-brett-kavanaugh/1966463001/
[ https://perma.cc/XWW4-XGSE ] (“Houser, of the National Sexual Violence Resource Center, said
the biggest impact of #MeToo is decreased stigma and increased awareness.”).
178. See Anna North, 7 Positive Changes that Have Come from the #MeToo Movement, VOX
(Oct. 4, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2019/10/4/20852639/me-too-movement-
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that “awareness-raising campaigns can have a large effect on the reporting of sexual
crimes,”179 and many acts of harassment can also be criminal in nature.
There have been different responses by industry to this persistent problem,
including enhanced training, increased policy measures, and new complaint
processes that have been introduced and implemented in the workplace.180
However, what now remains clear is the broad extent to which harassment
continues to be a problem. Indeed, countless recent studies have shown just how
broad-based sexual harassment continues to be in the workplace.181 The #MeToo
movement has also shown us the extent to which companies and industries will go
to cover up harassment, both legally and otherwise. Prior to this movement, women
in all workplaces were largely unaware of the extent of the problem and many often
felt isolated and alone when they were subjected to a hostile work environment.182
This is no coincidence. Through nondisclosure agreements, arbitration clauses, and
out-of-court, non-public settlements, companies have been extremely effective in
keeping claims of harassment quiet over the years.183 Indeed, there has been
enormous pressure on corporate America to change these policies, and some
high-profile companies have even done so in recent months.184 But, not all
measures have been legal in nature. Numerous workers have shared, and some cases
have revealed, that many supervisors and employers have resorted to physical and
sexual-harassment-law-2019 [ https://perma.cc/XA3F-P39V ] (“One of the biggest effects of the
#MeToo movement has been to show Americans and people around the world how widespread sexual
harassment, assault, and other misconduct really are. As more and more survivors spoke out, they
learned they were not alone. And people who had never had cause to think about sexual harassment
before suddenly saw how much it had affected their coworkers, children, parents, and friends.”).
179. Levy & Mattsson, supra note 175, at 5.
180. See North, supra note 178 (describing different impacts of the #MeToo movement).
Indeed, on the federal level, there have been efforts to pass legislation in this area, though these attempts
have largely failed. See BE HEARD in the Workplace Act, H.R. 2148, 116th Cong. (2019); see also BE
HEARD in the Workplace Act, S. 1082, 116th Cong. (2019).
181. See, e.g., HOLLY KEARL, NICOLE E. JOHNS, & ANITA RAJ, MEASURING #METOO: A
NATIONAL STUDY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT & ASSAULT 10 (2019), http://www.stopstreet
harassment.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/2019-MeToo-National-Sexual-Harassment-and-Assault
-Report.pdf [ https://perma.cc/2C2U-6D4U ] (noting thirty-eight percent of women reporting sexual
harassment at place of employment).
182. See Stefanie K. Johnson, Ksenia Keplinger, Jessica F. Kirk, & Liza Barnes, Has Sexual
Harassment at Work Decreased Since #MeToo?, HARV. BUS. REV. ( July 18, 2019), https://hbr.org/
2019/07/has-sexual-harassment-at-work-decreased-since-metoo [ https://perma.cc/5LHJ-74E2 ]
(“Social psychological theories suggest that stigmatizing experiences, like sexual harassment, can be very
damaging to self-esteem, especially because the stigmatized individuals fear that they are alone and share
in the blame for their mistreatment.”).
183. Tippett, supra note 164, at 263 (“Non-disclosure provisions can prohibit the employee
from revealing the amount of the settlement, discussions leading up to the settlement, the fact of the
settlement agreement, or even the facts giving rise to the dispute.”); See Sternlight, supra note 162, at
181 (“Critics have long worried that requiring employees to arbitrate rather than litigate claims will
undermine the force of law not only by suppressing claims, but also by requiring claims to be heard
privately and limiting easy access to precedent.”).
184. See Sternlight, supra note 164, at 204 (“Microsoft ended its use of forced arbitration clauses
with respect to sexual harassment claims in December 2017. Similarly, Uber and Lyft have now ended
forced arbitration of sexual harassment and assault claims.”).
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psychological threats to keep workers quiet; in some instances, workers have even
been physically abused.185
Over a hundred years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court reminded us of the “almost
universal” principle that a statutorily established time period “shall not begin to run
until the discovery of the fraud.”186 Because of #MeToo, we now know the extent
to which fraud, sexual abuse, and hostile work environments have been improperly
concealed by employers for years around the country. It is true that the courts,
including the Supreme Court, have been quite clear since the inception of equitable
tolling that this doctrine does not provide the opportunity for a litigant to
“inexcusably sl[eep] on his rights.”187 However, the #MeToo movement provides
us with definitive evidence that we remain miles away from this concern with
respect to hostile work environment claims, where employers have often actively
concealed their wrongful conduct.
Applying this doctrine in the workplace context decades ago to the Federal
Employers’ Liability Act,188 the Supreme Court held that under the facts of the case,
the time limitation of the statute should be tolled when fully “considering the Act’s
‘humane and remedial’ purposes.”189 In that case, like in situations we often face
today, the importance of rigidly applying a statute of limitations was “frequently
outweighed . . . where the interests of justice require vindication of the plaintiff’s
rights.”190 Justice now requires a closer look at how the courts examine the timing
restrictions in hostile work environment claims.
B. Guideposts for Tolling Title VII
This Article does not propose any type of congressional intervention over the
statutory time deadlines for employment discrimination claims, though others have
long pointed to the flaws inherent in Title VII’s extraordinarily short charge filing

185. See Beverly Engel, Why Don’t Victims of Sexual Harassment Come Forward Sooner,
PSYCH. TODAY: THE COMPASSION CHRONICLES BLOG (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.psychology
today.com/us/blog/the-compassion-chronicles/201711/why-dont-victims-sexual-harassment-comeforward-sooner [ https://perma.cc/BTY6-EEZK ] (“[W]e have evidence from recent events to validate
that fear. Sexual harassers frequently threaten the lives, jobs, and careers of their victims. And many
victims are frightened by the perpetrator’s position of power and what he could do with it. Those who
have reported sexual harassment or assault, especially by powerful men, have reported that they lost
their jobs, and that their careers or reputations have been destroyed.”).
186. Expl. Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 435, 449 (1918). See generally Holmberg v. Armbrecht,
327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946) (“[T]his Court long ago adopted as its own the old chancery rule that where
a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and ‘remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence
or care on his part, the bar of the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though
there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part of the party committing the fraud to conceal it
from the knowledge of the other party.’” (quoting Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 348 (1874)) (citing
Exploration, 247 U.S. 435; Sherwood v. Sutton, 21 F. Cas. 1303, 1307 (C.C.D.N.H. 1828) (No. 12,782))).
187. Holmberg, 327 U.S. at 396 (1946) (citing Russell v. Todd, 309 U.S. 280, 289 (1940)).
188. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 et seq. (2012).
189. Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 427–28 (1965).
190. Id. at 428.
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period.191 This Article also does not argue for a change in the way courts have
defined equitable tolling. Indeed, the federal courts have largely developed their
own tests on the applicability of equitable tolling.192 Rather, this Article seeks to
identify several core areas where the courts should hesitate prior to dismissing a
harassment claim on timeliness grounds. While all harassment cases deserve close
consideration, there are certain guideposts the courts should look to before rejecting
a hostile work environment claim filed outside of the statutorily prescribed period.
What is clear from the case law is that it is critically important to engage in a
careful factual analysis before rejecting a federal sexual harassment claim based on
a failure to satisfy Title VII’s time deadlines. As one federal court addressing a sexual
harassment claim properly surmised, the “cases indicate a detailed factual inquiry is
necessary to determine whether equitable tolling should be applied [and] additional
discovery [in the matter before the court] is required.”193 This is true in all hostile
work environment cases.
As discussed, the #MeToo movement has made profound progress in
bringing awareness to the problems of sexual harassment and abuse that occur every
day in workplaces across the country.194 We know far more today than we did just
a few short years ago about the true nature of these issues and the pervasive extent
to which sexual harassment has invaded our employment culture. Importantly, this
movement has also brought into the open the extent to which corporate America
and many individuals cloaked with supervisory authority have both participated in
the harassment and gone to great lengths to cover it up.195 This movement has done
much to disrupt these concealment efforts by businesses,196 though there is far more

191. See generally Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a
Rights-Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859 (2008); Heydemann & Tejani, supra note 59, at 75–76;
Ronald Turner, Pliable Precedents, Plausible Policies, and Lilly Ledbetter’s Loss, 30 BERKELEY
J. EMP. & LAB. L. 336 (2009).
192. See, e.g., Steiner v. Henderson, 354 F.3d 432, 435 (6th Cir. 2003) (“In considering whether
equitable tolling should apply, we generally look at five factors: (1) whether the plaintiff had actual
notice of the time constraints; (2) whether she had constructive notice of the time constraint; (3) the
degree of diligence exerted in pursuing her rights; (4) the degree of prejudice to the defendant; and (5)
the reasonableness of plaintiff’s ignorance of the time constraint.”); Zerilli-Edelglass v. N.Y.C. Transit
Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 80–81 (2d Cir. 2003) (setting forth similar test in Second Circuit); Jobe
v. Immigr. & Nationalization Serv., 238 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir. 2001) (setting forth similar test in
First Circuit).
193. Delmar v. Raytheon Aircraft Corp., No. 96–1002–JTM, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12913, at
*19 (D. Kan. Aug. 9, 1996). See id. at *13–19 (outlining employment discrimination cases on equitable
tolling in this area).
194. See supra Section II.A. (discussing the history and role of the #MeToo movement in our
society).
195. See, e.g., Tiffany Hsu & Mohammed Hadi, Wynn Leaders Helped Hide Sexual Misconduct
Allegations Against Company’s Founder, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2009), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/04/02/business/wynn-resorts-sexual-misconduct-steve-wynn.html [ https://
perma.cc/C4WK-ULUY ]; Tippett, supra note 164, at 234 (“The MeToo movement also revealed the
ways in which the law can be misused to enable and conceal harassment.”).
196. See generally Jena McGregor, New Database Aims to Expose Companies that Make
Employees Arbitrate Sexual Harassment Claims, WASH. POST (Feb. 27, 2020), https://
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to do. The research in this area now clearly demonstrates the lengths employers
have gone to prevent workers and the public from gaining a true understanding of
the abusive cultures that exist in the workplace.197 While these efforts may often be
undertaken to prevent public-relations crises, they have also had a chilling effect on
the ability of victims to successfully bring harassment claims in the courts.
Indeed, the intentional, and highly successful, efforts made by businesses to
stall or prevent these claims have had adverse effects on sexual harassment victims
across the country. A company need only run out the short clock—180 or 300 days
depending upon the state—to forever prevent a plaintiff from obtaining the proper
statutory remedies for the abuse.198 As one recent study by the EEOC revealed,
“[r]oughly three out of four individuals who experienced harassment never
even talked to a supervisor, manager, or union representative about the
harassing conduct.”199
The #MeToo movement has made clear that the short statutory time filing
periods can be unfair. We now have an awareness that previously did not exist about
the extent of this problem, and the federal courts have a corresponding duty to
more aggressively intervene and “locate ‘a just result’ in light of the circumstances
peculiar to the case.”200 The courts have a further duty to step in to enforce the
“humane and remedial” purposes of the legislation.201 As recent data have
demonstrated, sexual crimes as a whole have tended to go underreported, and even
where sufficiently alleged, there is often a delay in reporting.202 There are numerous
valid reasons why these crimes are not alleged—or that it takes a longer period of
time for a victim to bring the allegations—and many of the same concerns of sexual
assault victims apply in the hostile work environment context.203
www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/02/27/new-database-reveals-which-companies-preventemployees-filing-sexual-harassment-lawsuits/ [ https://perma.cc/5E9M-ESS5 ].
197. See, e.g., Heidi Lynne Kurter, 4 Things You Didn’t Know About Non-Disclosure Agreements,
FORBES (Jan. 21, 2020, 8:55 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/heidilynnekurter/2020/01/21/4things-you-didnt-know-about-non-disclosure-agreements/#428346897c12 [ https://perma.cc/8B3ZCDTL ] (“Companies from all industries are being exposed for their corrupt NDA practices to cover
up hostile work environments. High-profile cases such as Fox News, NBC Universal, Binary Capital
and the Weinstein Company, to name a few, have demonstrated the abuse of NDAs to conceal bullying,
harassment, discrimination and toxic workplace cultures.”).
198. 29 U.S.C. §§ 626, 633.
199. CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
REPORT OF THE CO-CHAIRS OF THE EEOC SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF HARASSMENT
IN THE WORKPLACE (2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/sites/default/files/migrated_files/eeoc/task_
force/harassment/report.pdf [ https://perma.cc/7DW3-W8V2 ].
200. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 121 (2002) (quoting Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424–25 (1975)).
201. Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 427 (1965).
202. See W. David Allen, The Reporting and Underreporting of Rape, 73 S. ECON. J. 623 (2007),
www.jstor.org/stable/20111915 [ https://perma.cc/NKA5-JDD4 ] (addressing underreporting of
sexual abuse); Levy & Mattsson, supra note 175, at 29 (discussing recent data on sexual crimes); Morales,
supra note 175 (discussing the potential impact of the #MeToo movement on reporting).
203. Cf. Levy & Mattsson, supra note 175, at 5–6 (“Underreporting of sexual misconduct is a
serious global problem. . . . [A]mong eight countries . . . only 15% of sexual assaults were reported to
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The way that the courts can enforce the remedial provisions of Title VII, and
in which they can achieve a just result and honor the humane purposes of the federal
employment discrimination provisions, is through equitable tolling. No legislative
action is needed if the courts are more willing to take a holistic approach to equitable
tolling in sexual harassment cases considering the additional information that we
now have about this problem. Judicial intervention could thus make substantial
strides in resolving the problem and preventing these claims of harassment from
getting mired in the weeds of unfair procedure.
Along the same lines, it is important to remember the Supreme Court’s
emphasis on avoiding “the evils of archaic rigidity” and its admonition against
“mechanical rules” that leave no room for “flexibility.”204 The need to approach
these claims on an individualized basis is critical, and courts should hit the pause
button before immediately dismissing a sexual harassment case for failure to satisfy
administrative filing requirements. As the Supreme Court has advised, fairness
demands that we examine these types of equity issues “on a case-by-case basis,”205
and that is precisely what should be done when looking at sexual abuse in
the workplace.
As a general rule, it likely makes sense—given what we now know about the
prevalence of sexual harassment—for the federal courts to be cautious in all cases
involving a failure of the plaintiff to satisfy the time filing deadlines under Title VII.
This is not to say that every victim who fails to timely bring a claim should be
permitted to proceed with her case; rather, the courts should be particularly vigilant
in those instances to make sure that dismissal renders an equitable and fair result.
Beyond this general caveat, however, there are several markers that the courts
should look to in sexual harassment cases that might suggest that a flexible approach
to the filing deadlines is needed. Below, this Article identifies five guideposts that
the courts should look to in sexual harassment cases as areas where particular
caution is warranted prior to dismissal. It is worth emphasizing that these
pigeonholes are in no way exhaustive, and again, the courts should be careful before
dismissing any sexual harassment claim based on timeliness grounds. Nonetheless,
these five guideposts will help serve as a warning for the judiciary and help flag areas
where prior case law and immediate equitable considerations demand that the case
receive a closer look. Each pigeonhole is addressed below.

the police in 2010–2017, compared to 35% of non-sexual assaults. . . . Given the potentially large
positive externality from reporting, but the high personal cost of doing so, it is likely that sex crimes are
reported at a rate that is below what is optimal from a social welfare perspective.”).
204. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 650 (2010) (first quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass
Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 248 (1944); and then quoting Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327
U.S. 392, 396 (1946)).
205. Id.
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1. Psychological Harm
As the #MeToo movement has made particularly clear, and as we have known
for decades, sexual harassment, assault, and abuse can all lead to lasting emotional
distress and psychological harm.206 We are only now beginning to learn just how
impactful this type of abuse can be in the employment setting.207 Where a victim of
sexual harassment in the workplace suffers this type of trauma, she may have
substantial difficulty filing a timely claim, given the emotional toll of the employer’s
abusive conduct to which she has been subjected.208
As discussed above, there is already federal case law that identifies the
difficulty victims of workplace sexual harassment can have when it comes to filing
a timely claim. Workers who are badly treated, and sometimes assaulted, may find
it psychologically impossible to go to the EEOC within 180/300 days. As one
federal court properly observed, “[f]iling an EEOC charge is an adversarial
proceeding that forces a complainant to relive the memories of the alleged
discriminatory treatment.”209 Where an employer has caused psychological trauma,

206. Rebecca Campbell, Emily Dworkin & Giannina Cabral, An Ecological Model of the Impact
of Sexual Assault on Women’s Mental Health, 10 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE, & ABUSE 225, 225–26 (2009),
http://www.jstor.org/stable/26636192 [ https://web.archive.org/web/20220117173133/https://
www.jstor.org/stable/26636192 ] (“The impact of sexual assault on women’s mental health has been
extensively studied and has been the subject of multiple prior reviews. The reviews from the early 1900s
are remarkably consistent with more recent syntheses of the literature: rape is one of the most severe
of all traumas, causing multiple, long-term negative outcomes. Between 17% and 65% of women with
a lifetime history of sexual assault develop posttraumatic stress disorder . . . . Many (13%–51%) meet
diagnostic criteria for depression. Most sexual assault victims develop fear and/or anxiety . . . . It is not
uncommon for victims to experience suicidal ideation.” (internal citations omitted)); Jamie Ducharme,
Any Type of Sexual Harassment Can Cause Psychological Harm, Study Says, TIME (Nov. 9, 2017, 2:42
PM), https://time.com/5017072/sexual-harassment-psychological-damage/ [ https://web.archive.org/
web/20210512201913/https://time.com/5017072/sexual-harassment-psychological-damage/ ](“The
research, which was published Thursday in the International Journal of Public Health and comes at a
time when sexual misconduct is under increasing public scrutiny, finds that non-physical sexual
harassment—such as derogatory comments, unwanted sexual attention and unsolicited explicit
images—can take a psychological toll, potentially exacerbating symptoms of anxiety, depression,
negative body image and low self-esteem.”).
207. See Dorothy Roberts, The Collective Injury of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN
SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 165, at 365 (“The harm of sexual harassment is collective
because it affects the status of all women in the workplace where it occurs, in the labor market, and in
society as a whole. Although sexual harassment inflicts a personal injury on the victim, ‘it is a social
wrong and a social injury that occurs on a personal level.’” (quoting CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 173 (1979))).
208. See FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 199, at 10 (Victims “experience[ ] similar negative
psychological, work and health consequences.”); Nancy Chi Cantalupo & William C. Kidder, A
Systematic Look at a Serial Problem: Sexual Harassment of Students by University Faculty, 2018 UTAH
L. REV. 671, 696 (“Meta-analytic studies . . . show that sexual harassment has substantial negative
consequences for the mental health and wellbeing of victims, including symptoms of depression,
anxiety, withdrawal and post-traumatic stress disorder . . . .”).
209. Tsai v. Rockefeller Univ., 137 F. Supp. 2d 276, 282–83 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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it can thus be understandably difficult for an employee to relive this trauma by
bringing a claim against the business.210
In one of the seminal cases in this area discussed at length above, Stoll
v. Runyon,211 the federal appellate court found equitable tolling applicable in a Title
VII sexual harassment case where the employer’s abusive conduct caused the
worker to suffer severe psychological harm, and it was even determined that the
plaintiff was “totally psychiatrically disabled.”212 Similarly, in the more recent case
of Kennedy v. Berkel & Co. Contractors,213 the court declined to dismiss the claim
against the employer given the possibility that the company’s severe harassment and
abuse resulted in the plaintiff’s mental incapacitation.214 Stoll and Kennedy both
provide important reminders of the severe harm employers can cause workers
through harassment and abuse.
While the discriminatory acts may ultimately cease, or the worker may separate
from employment, the psychological damage can last for years, or even a lifetime.
Where this type of psychological harm is inflicted by an employer, that business
should suffer the full consequences of its actions. As one of the primary principles
of equity demands, an employer that stops a plaintiff “from asserting a [timely]
claim” through its own “wrongful conduct” should not be permitted to benefit
from the improper behavior, and equitable tolling may be appropriate.215
Where Stoll, Kennedy, and other federal cases fall short, however, is in
recognizing the potential breadth of psychological harm caused by all sexual
harassment. Now that we are aware of the full extent to which this abuse is present
in the workplace, as well as the efforts employers will go to in suppressing this
information, we should no longer require a case to involve facts as severe as rape,
mental incapacity, or psychiatric disability to toll a filing period.216 Rather, the
proper inquiry should be whether or not the hostile work environment perpetrated
by the employer caused sufficient psychological harm or emotional distress that
would prevent an ordinary person from filing a claim in a timely manner. This is
obviously a factually distinct question that will vary depending upon the specific
case, and this determination will result in an individualized inquiry for harassment
claims. Nonetheless, victims of sexual harassment clearly deserve, through ordinary
210. See id. at 282 (“The severity of a mental disability is a fact question that cannot be decided
as a matter of law based solely on the pleadings.”).
211. 165 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 1999).
212. Id. at 1240, 1243.
213. 319 F. Supp. 3d 236 (D.D.C. 2018).
214. Id. at 241.
215. Stoll, 165 F.3d at 1242; see also Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232–33
(1959) (“[N]o man may take advantage of his own wrong. Deeply rooted in our jurisprudence this
principle has been applied in many diverse classes of cases by both law and equity courts and has
frequently been employed to bar inequitable reliance on statutes of limitations.” (footnote omitted));
English v. Pabst Brewing Co., 828 F.2d 1047, 1049 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting that the equitable tolling
doctrine is “based primarily on the view that a defendant should not be permitted to escape liability by
engaging in misconduct that prevents the plaintiff from filing his or her claim on time”).
216. See generally Stoll, 165 F.3d 1238; Kennedy, 319 F. Supp. 3d 236.
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principles of equity, the opportunity to demonstrate why the employer’s abusive
conduct resulted in a delayed charge filing.
As the Supreme Court identified years ago in Harris v. Forklift Systems,217 the
prohibitions of the statute “come[ ] into play before the harassing conduct leads to
a nervous breakdown.”218 Given that the Court has identified this standard for
harassment cases, it seems equally unfair to require plaintiffs to have a nervous
breakdown if the employer’s conduct results in an inability to file a timely claim.
Only by considering all of the circumstances related to each case can a court
properly determine whether equitable tolling should apply. Quite simply, the bar is
currently too high, and the courts should take a more relaxed approach when
considering whether tolling is appropriate where the employer’s conduct has caused
psychological harm or emotional distress.
2. Threats
Where an employer, or an individual with supervisory authority, has made
specific or indirect threats to a worker (or to their family or loved ones), it should
immediately be cause for concern as to whether the victim will have difficulty filing
a timely harassment claim. Where an employee is concerned that their employer’s
behavior threatens her safety or that of others close to her, it will logically follow
that this worker may avoid filing an EEOC charge if she believes doing so could
result in physical harm.
As discussed, the federal courts have already addressed the applicability of
equitable tolling in such extreme situations. Indeed, the courts have even applied
tolling where an employer’s threats of physical harm were registered against both
the employee and her family,219 and the courts made clear that as a general matter,
threatening behavior is sufficient to pause the time deadlines of the statute.220
Again, this is simply a straightforward matter of equity, and an employer should not
be permitted to attempt to run out the clock on the statute of limitations through
threats of physical harm.221
The #MeToo movement and additional research have revealed the extent to
which employers have subjected workers to physical harm. Indeed, many women
have reported threats to their own safety and that of others, and there are startling
numbers of reports of workers who have been subjected to physical harm.222 In one

217. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
218. Id. at 22.
219. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Willamette Tree Wholesale, Inc., No. CV-09-690
-PK, 2011 WL 886402 at *8 (D. Or. Mar. 14, 2011).
220. Koppman v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., No. 90-4503, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9115, at *37
(E.D. La. June 16, 1992).
221. Id.
222. See Workplace Violence, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, https://www.osha.gov/workplaceviolence [ https://perma.cc/DK3J-BR2A ] ( last visited Jan. 24, 2022 ) (“According to the Bureau of
Labor Statistics Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI), of the 5,147 fatal workplace injuries that
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study, a number of male workers surveyed even conceded that they had engaged in
such improper conduct, including “pressuring people into sexual acts by offering
rewards or threatening retaliation.”223
Equity thus demands that the courts look closely at those cases where a worker
has failed to meet the Title VII sexual harassment time filing deadlines because her
safety has been threatened by the employer. Where a reasonable person would have
similar concerns about her safety or that of those close to her, tolling of the statute
will likely be appropriate until the threat passes. Any other result would allow the
employer to greatly benefit from its own wrongful acts and could even provide a
perverse incentive for companies to engage in this type of improper conduct in an
effort to cause the worker to miss the deadline.224
It is also important to note that the courts should look to the reasonableness
of a victim’s belief in the employer’s perceived or actual threat. The credibility of
the threat itself should not be the standard. Even if an employer lacks the ability to
carry out the actions, it should make no difference for purposes of tolling the
statute—rather, the key inquiry is whether the victim had a good-faith belief that
her safety was at risk.
3. Fear
The third guidepost that the courts should address when considering whether
to equitably toll a Title VII harassment claim is fear. This proposed pigeonhole is
more subtle than threatening behavior, but it is just as important. Whereas threats
examine the overt conduct or statements of employers,225 fear looks more to the
reasonableness of a harassment victim’s perception of potential retaliation by the
employer if a complaint is made. Fear can also be reasonably derived from prior
physical assaults by an employer.226
In the context of sexual abuse, victims may have concerns about reporting as
a result of “the loss of privacy and the risk of recrimination and reprisal.”227 These
same concerns carry over to the workplace, and harassment victims often fear both
occurred in the United States in 2017, 458 were cases of intentional injury by another person. However
it manifests itself, workplace violence is a major concern for employers and employees nationwide.”).
223. Jugal K. Patel, Troy Griggs & Claire Cain Miller, We Asked 615 Men About How They
Conduct Themselves at Work, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2017/12/28/upshot/sexual-harassment-survey-600-men.html [ https://perma.cc/WK9D-Z9TK ].
Indeed, ten percent of men also admitted to “touching, making comments about someone’s body, and
asking colleagues on dates after they’ve said no.” Id. See generally Joseph A. Seiner, Plausible Harassment,
54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1295, 1326 (2021) (discussing study in greater detail).
224. See Glus v. Brooklyn E. Dist. Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232 (1959) (“[N]o man may take
advantage of his own wrong.”). See generally Koppman, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9115.
225. See supra Section III.B.2 (explaining basis of threats as a basis to equitably toll Title VII
time filing deadlines).
226. See generally Allen, supra note 202, at 638–39 (“[C]ompelling evidence indicates that
[nonreporting rape victims] concerned themselves with . . . a different kind of personal concern, related
to the fear of reprisal from the offender.”).
227. Id. at 640.
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potential stigmatization and fear of retaliation from the employer. Fear can also
come from the way an employer has mishandled prior complaints. One well-known,
recent study found that “only 32% of women agreed that harassment was something
they could report to their employer without fear . . . [and o]nly 30% of women
strongly agree that their employer handled the harassment situation properly.”228
The courts have generally not considered fear as an independent basis for
equitably tolling a workplace claim under Title VII, but fear should be considered
as strongly as any of the other factors currently recognized by the courts. An
employee will have a legitimate basis to equitably toll a claim where (1) that worker
reasonably fears that her employer will retaliate if a complaint is filed, or (2) a
harassment victim sees the futility of complaints filed by others in the past, or
(3) there is a reasonable belief that coworkers will be punished if a complaint is filed.
This list is not exclusive, however, and fear can take many forms. An employer
whose illegal conduct induces sufficient fear to deter a timely complaint should not
be able to benefit from that conduct, and the statute should be appropriately tolled
in those circumstances.
Fear may also be intertwined with any of the other guideposts addressed here.
Indeed, fear is likely to go hand in hand with any psychological harm or emotional
distress caused by an employer. As specifically addressed in the Willamette Tree
decision discussed above, in addition to threatening behavior, the plaintiff feared
retaliation against her family members.229 As its own independent factor, then, or
considered in conjunction with any of the other guideposts, the reasonably placed
fear of an employer’s punitive conduct should serve as a sufficient basis to toll the
sexual harassment time filing period for a claim brought under Title VII.230
4. Concealment and Misrepresentation
Employer deception is perhaps the best-known and most-recognized basis for
the application of equitable tolling in the workplace. As a general matter, the courts
have long recognized that “[e]quitable tolling applies where the defendant has
wrongfully deceived or misled the plaintiff in order to conceal the existence of a
cause of action.”231
228. EDISON
RSCH.
&
MARKETPLACE,
SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
IN
THE
WORKPLACE: #METOO, WOMEN, MEN, AND THE GIG ECONOMY 7 (2018), http://
www.edisonresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Sexual-Harassment-in-the-Workplacemetoo-Women-Men-and-the-Gig-Economy-6.20.18-1.pdf [ https://perma.cc/DYB3-C9R8 ]. See
generally Seiner, supra note 219, at 1327–28 (discussing the Edison Research and Marketplace study in
more detail).
229. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Willamette Tree Wholesale, Inc., No. CV-09-690PK, 2011 WL 886402, at 8* (D. Or. Mar. 14, 2011).
230. See FELDBLUM & LIPNIC, supra note 197, at 16 (“Employees who experience harassment
fail to report the behavior or to file a complaint because they anticipate and fear a number of
reactions—disbelief of their claim; inaction on their claim; receipt of blame for causing the offending
actions; social retaliation (including humiliation and ostracism); and professional retaliation, such as
damage to their career and reputation.”).
231. English v. Pabst Brewing Co., 828 F.2d 1047, 1049 (4th Cir. 1987).
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The #MeToo era has shown us the extent to which employers have gone to
conceal their own overtly harassing behavior.232 This concealment has been both
within the law—in the form of nondisclosure agreements and arbitration
clauses—and in violation of the law, in simply covering up the unlawful behaviors.
The result of both employer actions is the same; a victim of harassment may be
unaware of the nature and extent to which an employer has cultivated a sexually
abusive working environment. In hiding this conduct, the employer keeps its actions
from public view and creates a sense of isolation for the victim, who remains
unaware that others at the company have been similarly victimized.
The courts have opined that equity must prevail where an employer has
engaged in “wrongful concealment of facts,” and an employer should not be
permitted to hide information in an effort to run out the statute of limitations.233
As the #MeToo era has demonstrated, employers have been highly successful at
suppressing information about sexual abuse for years. And the widely regarded
perception of many victims is that their complaint, and the complaints of others,
will go unheard and unremedied. As one recent study found, “[a]mong women
who’ve personally experienced unwanted sexual advances in the workplace, nearly
all, 95 percent, say male harassers usually go unpunished.”234
Indeed, over two decades ago, the Supreme Court recognized the need to
bring acts of sexual harassment in the workplace to light. In Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton,235 and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,236 the Court developed a public
policy of encouraging employers to establish—and abide by—anti-harassment
policies in the workplace. In Faragher and Ellerth, the Court created an affirmative
defense for employers that permitted them to completely avoid liability for a hostile
work environment where the employer developed such a policy and effectively
implemented it.237 As the Court in Faragher held, this affirmative defense could be
asserted in cases not involving a tangible employment action where “the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct” the harassment and where the
purported victim “unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.”238

232. See, e.g., Tippett, supra note 164, at 234 (“The MeToo movement also revealed the ways in
which the law can be misused to enable and conceal harassment.”).
233. Reeb v. Econ. Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 930 (5th Cir. 1975).
234. GARY LANGER, UNWANTED SEXUAL ADVANCES: NOT JUST A HOLLYWOOD STORY 1
(2017), https://www.langerresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/1192a1SexualHarassment.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/2CDB-94JB ] (poll produced for ABC News and The Washington Post by Langer Research
Associates). See generally Seiner, supra note 223, at 1325–26 (discussing the Langer Research poll in
greater detail).
235. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
236. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
237. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764–65.
238. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
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The employer’s creation of a valid anti-harassment policy to root out and prevent
hostile conduct is often a critical component of this affirmative defense.239
Thus, over twenty years ago, the Supreme Court identified the need to
encourage a proper reporting process for sexual harassment, even providing a clear
legal benefit for employers that establish an effective complaint mechanism in the
workplace.240 The #MeToo movement that we see today reveals that the work of
the courts has been incomplete in this area and that a tremendous amount of
unlawful sexual conduct in the workplace has gone unreported and undetected. By
taking a more expansive approach to equitable tolling in these instances, the courts
can further effectuate the goals established by the Supreme Court in the Faragher
and Ellerth decisions. Where an employer has concealed its conduct or
misrepresented important facts, the courts should give victims of harassment
additional leeway in bringing their claims. And where an employer has failed even
to establish an effective anti-harassment policy, the courts should further consider
this as an indication of the employer’s lack of transparency regarding potential
discrimination in the workplace.
Some courts have been receptive to applying equitable tolling where an
employer has concealed its unlawful conduct or has made substantive
misrepresentations to the harassment victim. As the federal appellate court in Reeb
noted, an employer should not be permitted to benefit from its “wrongful
concealment of facts.”241 And as the federal court in Santiago v. SEPTA242
concluded, an employer’s “misrepresentation of omission” can be sufficient to toll
the clock in Title VII claims.243 The courts should not only continue to be receptive
to applying principles of equity to an employer’s deceptive acts, but they should also
act more affirmatively. The times we are in now demand vigilance, and the courts
should actively look to the facts when determining whether a harassment victim has
filed an untimely claim because the employer has hidden or misrepresented
important information. Indeed, where a reasonable person would have filed a timely
claim if all the relevant facts were known and remained unhidden, the court should
strongly consider tolling the charge filing period if necessary.244

239. Id. As the Court noted, “While proof that an employer had promulgated an antiharassment
policy with complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the need for a
stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately be addressed in any case
when litigating the first element of the defense. And while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the
corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an unreasonable
failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will
normally suffice to satisfy the employer’s burden under the second element of the defense.” Id. at
807–08.
240. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807–08; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764–65.
241. Reeb v. Econ. Opportunity Atlanta, Inc., 516 F.2d 924, 930 (5th Cir. 1975).
242. No. 13-5411, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64370 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 2015).
243. Id. at *20–22.
244. See Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1389 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The
statute of limitations will not begin to run . . . until the facts which would support the plaintiff’s cause
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Thus, this fourth guidepost serves as a reminder that an employer’s deceptive
practices—whether through hiding or misrepresenting important facts concerning
the extent of sexual harassment or abuse, or facts concerning the victim’s ability to
pursue her claims—are an area that the courts should actively consider before
dismissing a Title VII case based on an untimely filed charge. Before rejecting a
victim’s harassment claim on this basis, the courts should closely examine whether
the employer’s actions to hide or prevent the claim were the real cause of the
plaintiff’s late filing in the case.
5. Public Health
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a widespread impact on a variety of
different legal and workplace-related issues.245 The pandemic resulted in direct
change to how workers approach collective-bargaining rights, working at home, and
procedurally litigating employment-related claims.246 Indeed, this outbreak has
caused us to redefine what employment actually means, as many traditional
brick-and-mortar jobs have now been shifted online or to platform-based
employment.247 It is not surprising, then, that the pandemic has also disrupted the
ability of some workers to file timely employment-related claims.248
While the pandemic unquestionably presents the legislature and the courts
with novel and extraordinary circumstances, there are other emergencies that we
can look to with respect to the question of suspending time filing requirements.
Most notably, in the wake of the unprecedented and horrific events of September
11, 2001, fairness demanded a flexible approach to court deadlines. As one federal
court held at the time, “the equitable tolling doctrine is based on the general
principles of equity and fairness, [and] the unprecedented circumstances of the
World Trade Center disaster and subsequent Court closure warrant relief from a

of action are apparent, or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his or
her rights.”).
245. See generally JOSEPH A. SEINER, THE VIRTUAL WORKPLACE (2021).
246. See generally id.
247. See generally id.
248. See generally Kumar v. First Abu Dhabi Bank USA N.V., No. ELH-20-1497, 2020 WL
6703002 (D. Md. Nov. 13, 2020) (holding in employment discrimination case that “due to the
COVID-19 pandemic and the restrictions at the Courthouse, the pandemic constituted an extraordinary
circumstance, beyond plaintiff’s control, which impeded his ability to file the Complaint on time”);
Baxter v. Burns & McDonnell Eng’g Co., No. JKB-19-3241, 2020 WL 4286828, at *3 (D. Md. July 27,
2020) (tolling the limitations period under the Fair Labor Standards Act for putative opt-in collective
action members “[t]o offset any prejudice resulting from the pandemic,” and looking specifically to
achieving fairness in the case); McCoy v. Transdev Servs., No. DKC 19-2137, 2020 WL 2319117, at *5
(D. Md. May 11, 2020) (finding that the pandemic satisfied the “extraordinary circumstances” necessary
to toll the statute of limitations, when “[t]aking into account the current public health crisis, during
which many deadlines in civil cases have been extended”). But see Linz v. Core Values Roadside Serv.,
No. 2:20-cv-00107-SMJ, 2020 WL 3051341, at *5 (E.D. Wash. June 8, 2020) (“Plaintiffs [in FLSA class
action] have not provided sufficient explanation of why equitable tolling is appropriate [as they] cite no
particular delays owing to the pandemic in this case [and] fail to tie the requested amount of tolling to
the length of the alleged delays in effectuating service on Defendants.”).
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strict application of the 90-day statute of limitations in this case.”249 During this
crisis, the government also stepped in, and the governor of New York issued an
executive order tolling certain time filing requirements.250
Like all cases, however, the decision whether to apply equitable tolling is one
that is fact-specific, and the courts will require facts demonstrating that the
extraordinary circumstances exist that would warrant pausing the statute. Not all
public disasters or health issues will rise to this level, and several courts have
declined to extend deadlines during notable crises. For example, after hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, one court declined to apply equitable tolling to the time filing
period for a notice of appeal because the plaintiff had failed to show that the
disasters “directly resulted in barriers beyond his control that continued to exist
throughout the judicial-appeal period and prevented him from filing” a notice of
appeal in a timely fashion.251 Similarly, another federal court declined to toll a
statutory period following an earthquake as the plaintiff did not demonstrate “that
he diligently attempted to file a timely complaint” or that the incident “interfered
with [the plaintiff’s] ability to deal with his case.”252
As specifically applied to sexual harassment cases, the pandemic will
undoubtedly create circumstances where a flexible approach to the charge
filing deadlines is necessary. The outbreak of this virus may—in certain
circumstances—delay an individual’s ability to access information related to her
claim. It may also make it easier for employers to engage in deceptive practices about
the widespread nature of harassment and for harassers to conceal their unlawful
conduct. The outbreak will also make it harder for workers to detect retaliation that
they may suffer, as employers may attempt to couch their adverse actions in terms
of an economic downturn rather than as a result of a worker’s complaints about
harassment. And, as much work is now being performed remotely or virtually, it is
becoming increasingly difficult for employees to detect when their coworkers may
be experiencing a hostile work environment, thus potentially resulting in fewer
overall complaints of harassment.

249. Buckley v. Doha Bank Ltd., No. 01 CIV. 8865 (AKH), 2002 WL 1751372, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2002).
250. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9A, § 5.113.7 (2009); see also Scheja v. Sosa, 771
N.Y.S.2d 554, 555 (2004). The executive order “suspend[ed] temporarily, until further notice, CPLR
201 insofar as it barred actions the limitations period of which concluded during the period from the
date that the disaster emergency was declared . . . . The order provided an exception for those litigants
or their attorneys who have been directly affected by the terrorist attack and temporarily suspended
. . . CPLR 201 insofar as it barred an action, by or on behalf of such person, if the limitations period
with respect to a particular action concluded during the period the Executive Order was in effect
. . . .” Id.
251. Gelpi v. Shinseki, No. 07-827, 2013 WL 3895215 (Vet. App. July 30, 2013). But see Checo
v. Shinseki, 748 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (altering the standard such that plaintiff “must only
demonstrate due diligence during the extraordinary circumstance period [and not] due diligence
throughout the entire appeal period”).
252. Butler v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., No 90-16480, 1992 WL 180214, at *2 (9th Cir. July
29, 1992).
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These are just a few possible examples of how the pandemic might slow or
stall a worker’s sexual harassment complaint. There are likely countless other
scenarios, however, where equity will need to be strongly considered in sexual
harassment cases that have been impacted as a result of COVID-19. The pandemic
has changed the very way we define work in this country, and the federal courts
must recognize the need for a flexible approach to considering alleged sexual
harassment that has occurred during (or shortly before) the outbreak. Thus, sexual
harassment claims that are not filed in a timely manner during the pandemic should
receive close consideration by the courts for potential equitable tolling, and this
subset of cases should serve as the final guidepost for pausing the time filing
deadlines for these claims. Public health is a major consideration in many cases, and
the pandemic may understandably delay charge filing for many hostile work
environment claims, depending, certainly, on the specific facts involved.
IV. FEDERAL CASES WHERE PIGEONHOLES WOULD HAVE MADE A
DIFFERENCE
The above framework identifies several key guideposts for the courts to
consider when determining whether equitable tolling applies to federal sexual
harassment claims. The pigeonholes identified may seem a bit amorphous at first
glance, and it may not be readily apparent how these markers could be applied to
actual litigation. The guideposts identified here are intended to be more than merely
academic, however, and can be used by the courts and parties in ongoing and
prospective Title VII litigation. By way of example, then, this Part identifies several
cases where the markers suggested above could have resulted in a different result in
the federal sexual harassment case law.
For example, in Catone v. Brink, C.B.,253 the federal district court declined to
apply equitable tolling under circumstances where it should have been more fully
considered. In Catone, the plaintiff, who worked at a McDonald’s franchise, alleged
that she had been inappropriately subjected to numerous hostile acts, including that
her “breasts and buttocks” were touched “against her will.”254 Her complaints to
management went unaddressed, and she was subsequently retaliated against for
these claims.255 The plaintiff alleged that her employer’s conduct caused a “loss of
self-esteem” as well as “severe mental and emotional distress.”256 Plaintiff filed a
charge of discrimination 236 days after her eighteenth birthday, which was 315 days
after the final harassing act of the employer.257 Though her charge was thus filed
fifteen days late, the plaintiff asserted that the time period should be tolled given
that she was a minor when the harassment occurred.258 The court rejected this
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

488 F. Supp. 2d 214 (N.D.N.Y. 2007).
Id. at 216.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 217.
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argument as unsupported by the case law, holding that “[p]laintiff has failed to allege
how infancy creates circumstances so ‘extraordinary that the doctrine should
apply.’”259 This court’s decision completely misses the mark.
The federal district court in this case refused to toll the Title VII statutory
period for even fifteen days where the alleged conduct by the employer included
unwanted physical, sexual touching of a minor during the course of her
employment, which understandably resulted in severe distress.260 Under the first
guidepost addressed above, it seems reasonable to expect that psychological harm
will result when a minor is assaulted in this way and that it is more than appropriate
to pause the time filing period to account for this mental harm. Indeed, the plaintiff
filed the claim within 250 days of turning eighteen years of age and only missed the
filing deadline by a little over two weeks. By dismissing the claim, the court here
employs the exact “evils of archaic rigidity”261 that equitable tolling was designed to
prevent. It is difficult to see how the physical assault of a minor is not by definition
the type of “extraordinary circumstance” that would permit an employee an
additional two weeks to file her claim. It is equally difficult to understand how
allowing this claim would prejudice the employer in any way.
As the guideposts proposed above suggest, we must look at these cases
holistically. Where physical assault results in emotional harm, equity would demand
that we allow some flexibility to a minor in filing her sexual harassment claim under
Title VII. The recent studies and better understanding that we now have of the
impact of this type of sexual assault on a victim reflect that a longer time filing
period would be warranted in this case.262 It seems entirely reasonable to apply more
flexibility, and less rigidity, when the assault of a minor has been alleged. The better,
more equitable course here would be to allow the employer to defend against the
merit of the allegations, rather than to strictly adhere to the statutory timelines the
court imposed.
Similarly, in Hentosh v. Herman M. Finch University of Health Services/The
Chicago Medical School,263 a federal appellate court demonstrated, in classic fashion,
how the judiciary often misunderstands and misapplies sexual harassment law. In
Hentosh, an assistant professor at the University alleged that her department chair
had “engaged in a pattern and practice of sexual favoritism in the workplace” and
that he had “made unwanted and unwelcome sexual demands of at least four
women” in the workplace.264 The plaintiff further alleged that another female
259. Id. at 218.
260. Id. at 215–18.
261. Rudolph, supra note 24, at 131 (citing Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 650 (2010)).
262. See supra Section II.A. (addressing the #MeToo movement and better understanding we
now have of the impact of sexual assault on victims in recent years).
263. 167 F.3d 1170 (7th Cir. 1999).
264. Id. at 1172. Hentosh did not allege that she was one of the women to whom these demands
were made, and the district court held that the plaintiff had failed to sufficiently allege the elements of
a hostile work environment claim. Id. at 1173. The appellate court limited its reasoning to the timeliness
of the claim, avoiding the question of whether the allegations themselves rose to the level of a Title VII
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professor who had engaged in a sexual relationship with this department chair
received favorable treatment in her employment compared to her colleagues.265 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s Title VII
hostile work environment claim because her charge was untimely.266 The plaintiff
explained that she had not filed her claim until fifteen months after the department
chair resigned because she only became fully aware of the hostile work environment
and sexual favoritism after the chair’s departure.267 At the heart of this request for
equitable tolling, then, was that the plaintiff “was not able to obtain enough
information regarding the existence of a claim because . . . [the department chair]
was secretive about his sexually harassing conduct.”268 Indeed, the plaintiff alleges
that the conduct of the department chair remained hidden until “after his
resignation [when] this information gradually c[a]me to light.”269
In rejecting the application of equitable tolling in this case, the Seventh Circuit
placed too heavy of a burden on the plaintiff.270 The court declined to apply the
doctrine because the plaintiff “makes absolutely no showing that a reasonable
person exercising due diligence would not have been aware of the possibility of a
claim based on the sexual harassment she claims to have experienced as a result of
the supposed hostile work environment.”271 The plaintiff thus purportedly failed to
act diligently “in order to obtain the information essential to filing her suit.”272
This standard simply places too heavy of a requirement on the victim in sexual
harassment cases. As we now know in light of recent research, employers have gone
to great lengths to improperly conceal unlawful sexual activity in the workplace.273
By rejecting this claim on the basis that the harasser kept his conduct secret and
hidden from the plain view of other employees, the court adopts a policy of
encouraging this type of concealment. As the guideposts recommended above
identify, concealment and deception are among the more common methods that
employers use to run out the clock in harassment cases. Now that we have a better
understanding of the lengths employers will go to in hiding this type of conduct, we
must take a much more flexible approach to the filing deadlines in these cases.
In Hentosh, the plaintiff’s claim was late by months, not years, and it is difficult
to see how the employer would be prejudiced in defending against such a claim.274
The employer in the case should certainly not have been rewarded for its success in
violation. Id. at 1175. Some of the facts of the case also raise the interesting question of the extent to
which “paramour preference” can form the basis of a Title VII claim, but the appellate court did not
address this issue as part of its holding. Id.
265. Id. at 1172.
266. Id. at 1175.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. (emphasis added).
272. Id.
273. See supra Section III.B.4. (discussing employer concealment of sexual harassment).
274. Hentosh, 167 F.3d at 1175.
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keeping the hostile work environment quiet. And it is misplaced analysis for the
court to blame the victim for failing to exercise proper diligence in uncovering the
information that had been improperly concealed by the harasser, as the court in
Hentosh reasoned.275 This situation is extraordinarily common, and in light of what
we now know about sexual harassment, this is the exact circumstance where
equitable tolling would be appropriate. We should reject any policy that encourages
the concealment of the wrongs performed by a corporate entity or its agents, and
we should not place any blame on those subject to a hostile environment for failing
to uncover the employer’s deception earlier.
In another troublesome case that seems to improperly shift too heavy of a
burden to the victim, Ruffino v. State Street & Trust Co.,276 the federal court
considered a Title VII claim brought by a bank employee alleging that a senior vice
president at the business frequently harassed her by making remarks that “were
often laced with inappropriate and offensive sexual innuendo.”277 When the worker
complained to the manager of employee relations, this manager told her that she
had also observed the senior vice president make improper comments but that she
was inclined against “get[ting] in the middle of it.”278 The plaintiff subsequently
talked with an employment department manager, who instructed her to just
“tolerate” the conduct as “nothing . . . could be done.”279 The hostile conduct from
the senior vice president continued, and after an additional complaint, the bank
assured her of an investigation, which never took place.280 Instead, the bank
“accelerated their attempts to demean her work and scuttle her attempts at
continued success” in her employment.281 Only after receiving a highly critical
performance review following her complaints, and filing a response, did the bank
perform a “perfunctory” investigation finding no sexual harassment on the part of
the vice president.282 The stress of these events caused the plaintiff to take disability
leave and subsequently to resign from her employment.283
The federal district court dismissed the plaintiff’s Title VII sexual harassment
claim as untimely, as it was brought after the charge filing period had run.284 The
plaintiff asked that the court toll this period in consideration of the bank’s
“promises of investigation and remediation” which “prevented her both from
knowing that her grievances were not being dealt with in a serious manner and from

275. Id. at 1174–75.
276. 908 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Mass. 1995).
277. Id. at 1029.
278. Id. at 1030.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 1030–33. The plaintiff did transfer to a different position at the bank, where she had
far more limited contact with this vice president. Id. at 1032.
281. Id. at 1033.
282. Id. at 1034.
283. Id. at 1035.
284. Id. at 1039–40.
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asserting her rights.”285 The court declined to apply this equitable doctrine,
concluding that the plaintiff’s complaints internally at the bank demonstrated her
awareness of the potential cause of action.286 The court did not accept the argument
that the bank’s promised investigation misled the plaintiff; rather, the “repeated,
unheeded . . . stonewalling by supervisors” should have made the plaintiff aware
that the bank would not perform an adequate investigation into her allegations.287
While the court understood that the worker might “hope against hope for internal
redress,” it was simply unreasonable for this employee “to rely on [the company’s]
alleged representations” and she should not have counted “on a recalcitrant
workplace grievance process.”288
This decision seems to fly in the face of the well-defined purposes of equitable
tolling, including preventing an employer from benefiting from its own misdeeds.
Here, the employee seemed to do everything right—she complained multiple times
of sexual harassment and her allegations were simply rebuffed.289 She attempted to
resolve the matter internally within the company and relied on a promised
investigation by the employer, which at first did not take place and then was
performed in a wholly perfunctory way.290 The employer lied to the sexual
harassment victim and concealed the true nature of the almost nonexistent
“investigation” it was performing.291 The concealment and misrepresentations
made by the bank, as well as the psychological harm inflicted by this employer, make
it more than reasonable and foreseeable that the plaintiff would file her charge in a
delayed manner.
By shifting the blame to the employee (for not realizing soon enough that the
bank was blatantly lying to her about performing any substantive investigation),
the court misunderstands the basic nature and purpose of the
employment-discrimination statutes and the time limitations they contain.292 By
engaging in lies and deception, the employer should bear responsibility for the
consequences, and it should have to answer for the improper actions of its vice
president. Indeed, there does not seem to be any prejudice to the employer caused
by the delayed filing; the victim here raised the issue numerous times and the
company had more than sufficient notice of the allegations that were being brought
against it.293 Looking to the guideposts set forth in this Article, future courts should
be far more hesitant in dismissing this (unfortunately all too common) type of claim.
Psychological harm, employer lies, and deception are all strong signals that equitable
tolling may be appropriate.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id. at 1041.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1042.
Id. at 1030–33.
Id. at 1032–34.
Id.
See supra Part II (discussing the purpose of charge filing time requirements in Title VII).
Ruffino, 908 F. Supp. at 1030–34.
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V. IMPLICATIONS OF PIGEONHOLES
The pigeonholes identified by this Article represent strong indicia of
circumstances where the courts should look to the potential need for tolling Title
VII’s time filing periods in cases of harassment. These factors are not exhaustive
and must be looked at holistically with all of the facts of the specific case. Indeed,
there are a number of implications for adopting the pigeonholes proposed here
(including benefits and potential drawbacks) that are worth addressing.
One of the greatest benefits of using the proposed approach is that it would
help streamline sexual harassment litigation. By providing clear guideposts for
tolling in harassment cases, the suggested approach would help the courts and
litigants to apply a complex legal doctrine to an already confusing area of
employment law. The suggested pigeonholes thus help synthesize those
circumstances where the courts should be wary of dismissing a hostile work
environment claim on timing grounds, flagging for the courts those cases where
additional caution is warranted. All hostile work environment claims deserve close
consideration, but the approach proposed here helps simplify the doctrine of tolling
in harassment cases, highlighting for the courts those instances where it may be
particularly appropriate. By bringing readily identifiable guideposts to these
complex topics, the proposed approach helps clarify and streamline a confusing area
of the law.
The proposed pigeonholes would also bring a strong educational component
to sexual harassment litigation. The doctrine of equitable tolling has evolved
gradually over the decades, while the #MeToo movement has dramatically changed
our understanding of workplace sexual harassment in recent years.294 The
guideposts set forth here thus help educate the courts and litigants on the reality of
hostile work environment cases and the difficulties harassment victims often face
when trying to bring a timely claim under Title VII’s restrictive administrative filing
requirements. Employer deception, psychological harm, workplace threats, induced
fear, and public health are all important considerations in harassment cases.295
Given our increased—and more recent—awareness of these issues, the courts may
not currently have a full understanding of the realities and challenges harassment
victims face in the workplace. The pigeonholes set forth here thus help increase
awareness and understanding of all these topics, providing an important educational
function for the courts.
The proposed guideposts also provide this streamlined and informative
approach in a very pragmatic way. The pigeonholes suggested here are only markers
for the courts to consider and are not binding on the judiciary. This provides the
courts with substantial flexibility when considering whether to apply tolling to a

294. See supra Part II and Section III.A (addressing the history of equitable tolling for harassment
claims and discussing the #MeToo movement).
295. See supra Part III (addressing areas of harassment that deserve close consideration on
timing questions).
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particular harassment claim, which is important given how widely the facts can vary
from case to case. A likely alternative suggestion—a congressionally mandated
change to Title VII’s time filing requirements—is less workable and far more
restrictive.296 While such a statutory change is likely warranted, the current filing
deadlines have remained static for over half a century297 and are unlikely to change
anytime soon. A more immediate and practical response to our increased awareness
of the pervasiveness of workplace sexual harassment is to provide a framework for
the courts to consider when addressing whether a claim has been timely filed. The
guideposts proposed here thus preserve the flexibility of the courts to toll individual
cases, while providing a general model to follow for these claims.
Perhaps one of the strongest objections that might be raised against these
guidelines is the same concern addressed by some of the early courts—that plaintiffs
may unreasonably sleep on their rights, thereby unfairly disadvantaging
defendants.298 Like any equitable doctrine, the concept of equitable tolling must be
applied by considering all the facts together, and defendants should—and
will—have every opportunity to present evidence that the harassment victim did
not diligently pursue her claim.299
Indeed, there should be little concern that the courts will fail to take a
plaintiff’s lack of diligence into proper account; the Supreme Court itself “ha[s]
generally been much less forgiving in receiving late filings where the claimant failed
to exercise due diligence in preserving his legal rights.”300 The Court has thus been
expressly unwilling to extend equitable tolling to a situation where the facts present
“at best a garden variety claim of excusable neglect.”301 The indicia proposed here
are not intended to override concerns over the potential lack of a victim’s diligence
in pursuing her legal remedies in a federal employment discrimination case. Rather,
they are simply signals for the courts and litigants to more closely examine all of the
facts in these cases and to take into account what we now know about widespread
sexual harassment in this country.
Another potential criticism is that the pigeonholes identified here provide too
relaxed of an approach to the time filing deadlines and that this would open the
floodgates of litigation. This criticism misses the mark. The approach advocated
here only flags those cases where fairness may require additional time for filing, and
296. See generally Section II.A (describing congressional policy behind short time
filing deadlines).
297. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 626, 633.
298. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 394–96 (1946); Purrington v. Univ. of Utah, 996
F.2d 1025, 1031 (10th Cir. 1993) (denying equitable tolling of statutory filing period in sexual
harassment case where alleged victim failed to diligently pursue claim). See generally Hugler v. Kazu
Constr., LLC, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1032 (D. Haw. 2017); Viti v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 817
F. Supp. 2d 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Pollock v. Chertoff, 361 F. Supp. 2d 126, 133 (W.D.N.Y. 2005);
Simon v. Food & Drug Admin., No. 04CV252(DLI)(CLP), 2005 WL 2105789 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2005).
299. See generally Pelnarsh v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 348 F. App’x 178 (7th Cir. 2009).
300. Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (citing Baldwin Cnty. Welcome
Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 151 (1984)).
301. Id.
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where equity is not outweighed by any potential harm to defendants. Thus, the
pigeonholes identified should not create any extensive new litigation; they merely
aim to level the playing field for victims of harassment. A legitimate basis to extend
the deadlines must exist to allow the claim, and something more than mere
inconvenience to the victim is required in all cases.302
Finally, some might also argue that these pigeonholes are too narrow and that
there may be instances not contemplated here where tolling would be appropriate.
While a fair concern, the guideposts suggested are not intended to be exhaustive;
rather, they serve as an attempt to capture the vast majority of instances where
tolling would be appropriate in a hostile work environment case. Courts should not
limit themselves only to these pigeonholes, however, as there will undoubtedly be
harassment cases that do not fit neatly within these parameters. When applying
equitable measures generally, and for harassment cases specifically, the courts must
maintain flexibility; no single framework will be able to capture the breadth of all
potential cases.303
At the end of the day, the benefits of the proposed model far outweigh any
perceived drawbacks. The framework advocated for here will help synthesize the
law in this area, providing clarity to a complex field. At the same time, the proposed
approach builds in substantial flexibility for the courts to address each case in an
individualized way, taking into account the vast and varied instances where tolling
may be appropriate for a harassment claim.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that the Title VII time filing
requirements should not be given an overly “technical reading,” as it is often the
victims of discrimination themselves, “‘unassisted by trained lawyers,’” who file the
initial charge.304 As our understanding of the prevalence of workplace sexual
harassment continues to evolve, the importance of avoiding a “technical reading”
of the timing requirements has grown increasingly important. Psychological harm,
employer threats, fear, workplace deception, and public health frequently prevent
harassment victims from filing a timely claim, often through no fault of their own.
While congressional intervention to extend these deadlines where necessary
would be ideal, such a solution is unrealistic. A more workable approach to this
issue would be for the courts to embrace a robust application of the centuries-old
doctrine of equitable tolling in hostile work environment cases. Given what the
research has demonstrated in recent years about the harm and frequency of
302. See, e.g., Hibbard v. Don Love, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 2, 3 (S.D. Tex. 1984) (stating that moving
is insufficient to extend statute of limitations); Davis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d 862, 864–65
(1st Cir. 1983) (noting that distance to court is not a basis for equitable tolling).
303. See generally supra Parts I–III (describing the case-specific nature of the equitable tolling
doctrine).
304. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 397 (1982) (quoting Love v. Pullman
Co., 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1972)).
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sex-based harassment, employers should no longer be allowed to run out the clock
on these claims through their own misconduct. This Article advocates for the more
aggressive use of equitable tolling in Title VII cases and identifies those instances
where application of this doctrine would be appropriate. There can be no doubt
that we must examine hostile work environment claims through the lens of the
current research in this area, and a closer consideration of all sexual harassment
cases is now warranted.

